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The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party was selected 
as the topic of this thesis because of my academic interest in, and 
personal experience with., aspects of China's political prqblenB. As 
an employee of the Ministry of Information of the Nationalist govem-
ment for several years., I was in a position to receive a personal 
insight into the worki~s of the Nationalist administration. I was 
also able to observe at first hand., while in China., the factors that 
promoted the development of the Chinese Communist Party. 
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich 
and to Dr. Guy R. Donnell of the Political Science Department of the 
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College for their tireless 
advice and assistance in preparing the manuscript and in making 
improvements in its composition and documentation. Particular grati-
tude is also due to Dr. Glenn B. Hawkins., Head of the Poli tica.1. 
Science Department of the Oklahana Agricultural and Mechanical College 
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CHAPI'ER I 
ORIGINS ·oF THE CHINFSE COMMUNIST PARTY 
The Chinese Communist Party was formed early in 1919 in Peking by 
a. group of Chinese intellectuals and stu:ients •1 
In 1920 Chen Tu-hsiu, a brilliant intellectual leader, made 
::ontact with the Comintern. Shortly afterwards the Comintem convened 
a. congress of oriental nations at Baku, to which the Chinese Communists 
sent representatives. 2 
In May, 1921, Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao summoned a conference in 
:>hanghai and proposed the formation of a Communist Party, while Chinese 
iforker-students in France, Germany, Russia, and Japan conferred and 
iecided to organize branches in those four countries.3 
By 1921, the Comintern had sent agents to China to consolidate the 
Jhinese Communist Party and to seek co-operation with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 
~he leader of the Chinese Revolutionary People's Party. H. Sneevliet, 
mder the name of Maring, was an energetic Comintem advisor in that 
9arly period. 4 
1u. s. Department of State, United States Relations With China 
(Washington, 1949), p. 41. (Henceforth referred to as the China White 
Paper). 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 42. 
~arold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 
L9Sl), p. SB. 
2 
Comintern propaganda concentrated on the fact that Western capitalis 
especially that of Great Britain, was using the backward countries of 
lsia as a source of profit to bolster itself, while Russia proclaimed 
1er willingness to live in peace and amity with her Asiatic neighbors, 
and work with them for the attainment of democracy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
liaB undoubtedly influenced by this propaganda.' 
In June, 1922, the military leaders in Canton revolted against 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, forcing him to flee to Shanghai where he joined forces 
nth the Comintern.6 In January, 19'23, Dr. Sun Yat-sen ~d Adolph Joffe, 
a representative of Russia, issued a joint statement, in which both 
agreed that the bolshevik dictatorship could not be introduced into 
Dhina, because there did not exist the conditions for its successful 
establishment. 
China would, however, accept the aid and collaboration of the 
Soviet Union and the Third International in the solution of her 
problems. 1 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, apparently convinced of the need of this 
belp, began the reorganization of the Kuomintang on soviet lines, and 
adopted a program of radical social reform. 8 As a result, Chinese 
officers were sent to Moscow for military training, and the Whampoo 
Military .Academy was established at Canton., where Russian officers 
gave tactical instructions to officers. 9 Following these events, the 
'John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, 1948), 
PP• 186-187. 
6Ibid. 
7chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945 (New 
York, 1947), P• 66. 
8Fairbank, ~· cit., p. 187. 
9Isaacs, ~· cit., p. 64. 
third Congress of the Communist Party was held in Canton, where the 
:iecision was made to co-operate with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in fighting the 
northern militaristst° Chiang Kai-shek was sent to Moscow in the 
sununer of 1923, returning in 1924 to become head of the Whampoo 
Military Academy.11 Meanwhile, Michael Borodin, an able organiZer who 
3 
h.ad been working for the Third International in Mexico, Scotland, arxl 
rurkey, arrived in China in September, 19'2.3. Borodin served as political 
advisor to the Kuomintang, and re-organiZed it as a revolutionary 
party along Connnunist lines. He helped to set up a poli~ical institute 
to train propagandists in the art of securing mass support. 
A second objective of the Comintern was to develop the Chinese 
Communist Party, and place its members in strategic positions within 
the Kuomintang. In 1924, members of the Chinese Communist Party were, 
by agreement, admitted to full membership in the Kuomintang, while the 
Chinese Communist Party maintained its separate existence. Thus, in 
March, 1924, Mao Tse-tung worked in the executive bureau of the Communist 
Party while he was a member of the executive bureau of the Shanghai 
local of the Kuomintang. The admission of Communists to the Kuomintang 
W'as based on the agreement that both parties unite to resist militarists 
and imperialists, and at this time the Chinese Communists numbered less 
than a thousand members •12 The death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in March, 1925, 
however, created a struggle for power inside the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun, 
during his life, had never been a leader of the masses, but after his 
lOchina White Paper, p. 42. 
llo. M. Green, China's Struggle with the Dictators (London, 1941), 
P• 112. 
12Fairbank, .2£• cit., PP• 188-189. 
lth, every faction of the Kuomintang joined in exalting him as the 
tbol of the national. revolution, and as the father of the Chinese 
iublic.13 
Wang Ching-wei, a left wing leader of the Kuomintang, became 
4 
Lirman of the Nationalist government, ani the Russians and Chinese 
o:nunists appeared to be firmly in control of the Kuomintang machine,14 
le members of the Communist Party were in strategic positions within 
1 civil administration and the army. Chiang Kai-shek, head of the 
1111poo Military Academy ani commander of the First Army, ~intained 
,se friendship with Borodin and by September of 1925, became 
miander-in-chief' of the Kuomintang armies. Chiang Kai-shek was 
ll'ged with the dual task of overthrowing the Peking government, which 
l been formed by the northern .militarists, Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fui 
l of unifying the country under the Nationalist nag.15 
In March of 1925, Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of Borodin's 
aporary absence from Canton to force Wang Ching-wei, the head of the 
~ionalist government, to leave the country. He strengthened his 
sition by disarming a number of loyal troops to the Communists and 
~orting several Russian advisors. Chiang Kai-shek 1s triumph was 
>rt, for in less than two n>nths, he was forced to compromise with 
a leftists to gain support from the masses to carry on the war against 
a northern warlords. The Communists were reinstated, and a number of' 
ssian advisors were attached to the Nationalist armies in order to 
1~ A. Nourse, A Short History of the Chinese (New York, 1935), 
317. 
14 o. M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945), 
• 72-73. 
l5rsaacs, ~· ill•, pp. 83-84. 
t'Ol Chiang Kai-shek and his followers. Borodin's position became 
mount and Communist influence reached its peak.16 
In July, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek led the united armies of the 
onal revolution northward f'ran Canton. In August, Hunan, Hupeh, 
Hankow fell into the hands of revolutionary armies, and by 
' 
,ber, all of central China was umer Nationalist control. In March, 
', the revolutionary armies occupied Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces 
entered Nanking am Shanghai.17 As Chiang Kai-shek' s soldiers 
·cached the cities of the Yangtze Valley, the wealthy mer_chants, 
~ers and industrialists flocked to his support in the hope of 
ting him against the Communists. Simultaneously, a struggle far 
~r had developed within the Kuomintang, as Chiang attempted to 
~riot the gro\dng power of the left wing or the Kuomintang, as the 
nunists and their sympathizers tried to consolidate their position. 
On March 22, 192?, after the revolutionary armies had reached 
righai, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the suppression of the labor unions, 
appreciation of which, the Shanghai Chinese Banker's Association 
sed a thirty-million silver dollar loan far Chiang Kai-shek.19 In 
il, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support or the conservative 
tion of the Kuomintang, set up his capital at Nanking, after the left 
ig of the Kuomintang and the Communists had established the seat of 
1 national governmnt at Hankow. One day before the formal inaugura-
,n of the Nanking government, the Central Executive Committee of the 
l6Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
17v1ctor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets (New York, 1934), 
61. 
18 Isaacs, .212• ill•, pp. 142-143. 
19Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
1orointang in Hankow, issued a manifesto by which Chiang Kai-shek and 
Ls collaborators were expelled from the Nationalist Party as traitors. 
le Nanking government responded by issuing a proclamation expelling 
1e Russians and outlawing the Communist Party. 20 The Nanking govern-
ant, in its manifesto., declared that: 
The Nationalist Party wishes to emancipate the Chinese 
people as a whole., that is to say., all classes., including 
farmers, workers., merchants, and soldiers. It does not wish, 
therefore., that only one class should dominate. Especially 
it does not desire the dictatorship of the proletariat. The 
Nationalist Party wishes to assure every Chinese of his entire 
liberty of thought and action. It will not therefore admit a 
super-government under Borodin. It only admits a government 
of a liberated China enjoying a full measure of freedom. The 
Nationalist Party wishes to assure the welfare and the progress 
of the entire nation. It cannot therefore allow 390 millions 
of Chinese citizens to be treated at will by 10 millions of 
Communists. Dr. Sun admitted the Communists into the Party 
as collaborators and the Russiam as friends. If the 
Communists wish to daninate and the Russians desire to ill-
treat us., that means the end of their activities.21 
In June., 1927, General Feng Yu-hsiang., the so-called "Christian 
eneral," withdrew his support from the left wing of the Kuomintang and 
eclared allegiance to Chiang., thus weakening the Wuhan government.22 
n July., 1927, Borodin and other Russian advisors returned to Moscow. 23 
t that juncture, Madame Sun Yat-sen., a leader of the left wi~ of the 
uomintang, issued a statement conceming the split between the 
uomintang and the Communists, in which she stated that: 
Dr. Sun•s policies are clear, if the leaders of the 
party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no 
20 
Yakhontoff., .2£• cit • ., p. 64. 
21Ib1d • ., PP• 74-75. (Quoted from the text as given by Dr. Wellingto11 
oo., in his memoranda presented to the Lytton Commission, p. 739.) 
22Harley Farnsworth MacNair., China in Revolution (Chicago, 1931), 
• 119. 
23rang Leang-li., The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution 
London, 19.30), p. 287. 
longer Dr. Sun•s true followers., and the party is no longer 
a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of . 
this or that militarist.... At the moment, I feel that we 
are turning aside from Dr. Sun•s policy of leading and 
strengthening the peopl!i therefore, I must withdraw until 
wiser policies prevail.~ 
After the split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, 
~e Nanking government started its purification of the armies and 
ivil service. Chiang Kai-shek and his followers., with unrestrained 
rutality, purged Communists., progressives, and radicals without 
iscrimination. 2$ From 1927 to 1937 thousands of innocent intellec- , 
uals and students were murdered in the campaign to suppress the 
omrnunis ts • 26 
In August, 1927., Chiang Kai-shek retired to private life as a 
esture toward facilitating a reconciliation between the warring 
actions within the Kuomintang. In December., Wang Ching-wei and other 
'uhan leaders asswned nominal control of the government in Nanlcing., 
hereupon in January., 1928, Chiang was reappointed commander-in-chief 
,f the Kuomintang armies, and in short order became chairman of the 
entral Executive Committee of Kuomintang and of its Military Counc11.27 
y June., 1928, he had defeated Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu and captured 
1eldng., which was renamed Peiping. 28 
After Chiang Kai-shek had outlawed the Communists in June, 1927., 
,he Executive Committee of the Chinese Co:nmrunist Party issued a decree 
24.r. C. Woo, The Kuominta. and the Future of the Chinese Revolution 
London, 1928), PP• 7 - 7 • t from Madame un Yat-sen•s statement 
,n the political situation in July., 1927, at; Wuhan.) 
25 
Yakhontof'f', ~· ~ • ., p. 78. 
26 
Isaacs, ~· cit., p. 296. 
27 
MacNair., ~· ill•, pp. 127-132. 
28 
Harry Gmmes, When China Unites (New York., 1937), P• 120. 
0 
.eclaring that it had withdrawn its representatives from the Wuhan 
:overnment. The Chinese Communists, together with the peasants I and 
rorkers • unions, Kuomintang progressives and elements of the Nationalist 
'orces, organized soviets and Red armies, in Kiangsi and other provinces 
1f south China. 29 
On August 1, 1927, the Chinese Communists, um.er Generals Ho Lung 
ind Yeh Ting of the Twentieth Army of the Kuomintang, and in coopera-
,ion with Chu Teh, who became commander-in-chief of Red armies, 
:arried out the historic Nanchang uprising in Kiangsi. Thi~ successful 
·evolt brought an armed force of fifteen thousand men into the Communist 
,rganization and became the nucleus of the Red armies. 30 After the 
•evolt at Nanchang, the Chinese CoilDJlUllists set up local soviets in 
:iangsi and Canton, and proclaimed a revolutionary policy that 
leprived the old upper classes of political power, and transferred 
,ower to the soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers. They reduced 
,he hours of work in factories, raised wages, abolished the taxes of 
,he central government, confiscated the property of the landlords and 
,f religious bodies, and redistributed it to the peasants. Women 
rere granted equal status and rights alongside men, and complete 
·reedom of assemb'.cy and speech for the people were decreed.31 From 
:iangsi and Canton, the soviets were extended to the neighboring 
1rovinces of Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hupeh, and as far as western 
zechwan.32 
29ouenther-Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), p. 10. 
30 
Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), P• 149. 
31 
Isaacs, .2£• ~., PP• 281-287. 
32Yakhontoff, .2£• £!1•, P• 82. 
In December, 1929, the Chinese Communists held a conference in 
he province of Fukien at which ways to improve the Red armies were 










Replace all doors when you leave a house. 
Retum and roll up the straw matting on which you sleep. 
Be courteous and polite to the people, and help them whem 
you can. 
Return all borrowed articles. 
Replace all damaged articles. 
Be honest in all transactions with the peasants . 
Pay for all articles purchased. 
Be sanitary,. and especially establish latrines a ~afe 
distance from people's houses • .33 
Three additional duties were ta~ht to the Red Army: 
(1) Struggle to the death against the enemy. 
(2) .Arm the masses. 
(3) Raise money to support the struggle • .34 
In military tactics four slogans were used: 
(1) When the enemy advances, we retreatl 
(2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them! 
(3) When the enemy seeks to avoid a batt].e, we attack! 
(4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue. 35 
In February, 19.30, local groups of the Chinese Communist Party 
eld an important conference in south Kiangsi to discuss the future 
9 
rogram of the soviets, and decided to establish the Kiangsi Provincial 
oviet govemment at Juishin.36 From that time, Mao Tse-tung and 
b.u teh became leaders of the Chinese Communists. The Nationalist 
overnment offered a reward of a half-million silver dollars for the 
tlapture of "Chu-Mao,• dead or alive.37 
33snow, ~· ill•, PP• 155-158 • 
.34n,id., P• 156. 
35Ibid • 
.36 
~., P• 158 • 
.3?Ibid., P• 5. 
...... 
Mao Tse-tung came from a poor peasant family. Mao hated his 
amily and the old Chinese system. As a child he was fascinated by 
tories of China's romantic heroes, and became an intellectual. rebel. 
hile a student, Mao became interested in radical politics and in 1920 
ecame a Marxist. In 1921 he joined the Chinese Communist Party, and 
n 1923, he became a member of the Kuomintang along with other 
ommunists.38 In 192.5 he became chief of the "agitprop" department 
,f the Kuomintang, and a candidate for the Kuomintang Central Committee. 
n 1926, Mao directed the peasant department of the Communi~t Party, 
.nd., following the split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese 
:ommunists in 1927, joined forces with Chu Teh and other Communists 
Lgainst Chiang Kai-shek. He concentrated his work on the organization 
•f the Chinese peasants and workers, and became the chairman of the 
:hinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese 
:ommum.s t Party. In 1930 Mao Tse-tung became poll tic al commissar 
•f the Red First Front Army 'While Chu Teh became commander-in-chief 
tf that army )9 
Early in 19.30 a split in tactics occurred within the Communist 
>arty between the so-called "Mao Tse-tung line" and the "Li Li-sen 
.ine." Li Li-sen had studied in France and was an accomplished labor 
>rganizer, who favored mass uprisings by the urban proletariat in 
,reference to the organization of peasant cooperatives. After the 
mccessful sovietization of Kiangsi, and in the wake of local victories 
>y Red armies over Nationalist troops, Li Li-sen and his followers 
)elieved that the time was ripe to direct an offensive to overthrow 
38Green, The Story of China's Revolution, op. cit., p. 139. 
39snow, 2.£• ill•, pp. 142-152. 
le Nanking government. This opinion was opposed by Mao Tse-tung., 
10 feared to risk the chances of defeat in offensive action against 
1e cities. Failure by the Communist forces to occupy Changsha proved 
i. Li-sen' s tactics to be wrong, whereupon Li Li-sen was expel.led from 
le Chinese Communist Party. His followers rebelled at Futien, but 
1e revolt was suppressed by Mao Tse-tung, and Li Li-sen fled to 
>Scow, leaving Mao Tse-tung the dominant leader within the Chinese 
>mmunist Party. 40 
In May., 19.3J, the Chinese Communist· Party held a confe~ence in 
:ianghai, to which delegates came from the soviets of Kiangsi, Hupeh, 
man, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, and were joined by others representing 
1e Red armies and Red trade unions or Shanghai, Nanld.ng., and Wuhan. 
1e conference brought together all the scattered soviets and unified 
1em into a centralized party organization. Many proposals were 
iopted as goals, such as the eight-hour working day, social insurance, 
Lvil liberties, the emancipation of women, the abolition of taxes 
nposed by the feudal and military authorities, cancellation of debts 
.red to usurers., and liquidation of landlordism. The conference voted 
> convene All-China Congress of Soviets, and elected a special 
>mmittee to make this possible. 41 
On November 7., 19.31., the anniversary of Russian "October Revolution., 0 
1e first Chinese Communist Congress of Soviets was convened at Juichin, 
1 Kiangsi province. A total of six hlllldred ten delegates were 
1sembled from Kiangsi, Fukien, and other provinces., from the Red 
~es and the Red labor unions. The first Congress of Soviets adopted 
40 
~., PP• 160-16.3. 
41 Yakhontoff., £2• cit., PP• 1.30-1.34. 
provisional constitution for the All-China Soviet Republic, and 
.ected Mao Tse-tung president of the All-China Soviet Republic.42 
The Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic comprised 
iventeen articles, the most important of which were the followl.ng: 
Article I. It shall be the purpose of the Constitution 
of the Chinese Soviet Republic to guarantee the democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the soviet 
districts and to secure the triumph of the dictatorship 
throughout the whole of China •••• 
. Article II. The Chinese soviet govermnent is building 
up a state of the democratic dictatorship of the workers 
and peasants. All power shall be vested in the soviets of 
workers, peasants and Red Army men in the entire toiling 
population •••• 
Article III. In the Chinese Soviet Republic, supreme 
power shall be vested in the All-China Congress of Soviets 
of workers, peasants, and Red Army deputies. In the interval 
between congresses, the supreme organ of power shall be the 
provisional All-China Central Executive Committee of the 
Soviets; the Central Executive Committee shall appoint a 
Council of People's Commissars, which shall conduct aJ.l 
governmental affairs, pass laws, issue orders, etc. 
Article VIII. The soviet government in China shall set 
itself the goal of freeing China from the yoke of imperialism. 
It shall refuse to recognize any political or economic 
privileges for the imperialists in China •••• 
Article X. The soviet government in China guarantees 
to the workers, peasants and toilers freedom of speech and 
the press as well as the right of assembly •••• 
Article XI. It is the purpose of the soviet govern-
ment in China to guarantee the emancipation of women •••• 
Article XIV. The soviet govermnent in China recognizes 
the right of self-determination of the national minorities 
in China, their right to complete separation from China, 
and to the formation of an independent state for each 
national minority •••• 43 
The Congress of Soviets also passed a number of important measures, 
uch as a Land Law and a Labor Law. The Land Law consisted of seven 
42Ihid. 
43 Ibid., PP• 217-221. 
·ticles, the most important of which stipulated: 
Article I. All the lands of the feudal lords and the 
lmdlords, the militarists and the tukhao, gentry and other 
big private landowners, shall be subject to confiscation 
without any compensation whatever, iITespecti ve of whether 
they themselves work their lands or rent them out on lease. 
The soviets must distribute the confiscated lands among the 
poor and middle peasants •••• 
Article II. The Red Army is the front rank fighter in 
the defense of the soviet goverrunent, and in the overthrow 
of the rule of imperialism. Therefore each Red Army man 
must be given a plot of Jand •••• 
Article VI. All lands belonging to religious institu-
tions, to temples, and all other public lands shall wit.nout 
fail be delivered into the possession of the peasants by the 
soviet government •••• 44 
The Labor Law contained twelve sections and seventy-two articles, 
1d was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung in December, 1931. The twelve 
~ctions consisted of: (1) General regulations. (2) Regulations 
>verning the hiring of workers. (3) Collective agreements and labor 
mtracts. (4) Working hours. (.5) Rest time. (6) Wages. (7) Woman 
tbor, adolescent labor and child labor. (8) Labor protection. 
~) The all-China federation of labor and its local organizations. 
LO) Social insurance. (11) Organs to adjust labor conflicts and to 
~termine violatiom of the labor code. (12) Amendments .45 
Another basic law was passed by the first Congress of Soviets that 
~gulated elections and fixed the powers of various organs of the new 
igime. The Congress also authorized the Central Executive Committee 
: the Soviets to form a Suprene Military Council, that was charged 
Lth the tasks of purging the Red Army of undesirable elements and 
4L.rbid., PP• 221-223. 
45Ibid., PP• 224-235. 
nancing the fighting ability of the Red Army, both in regard to 
mbers and quality. 46 
.1.4 
Pursuant to the first Congress of Soviets, the Chinese Communists 
t up the Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin, with Mao Tse-tung as 
s head. Seventy of the eight-five counties in Kiangsi province 
re under the control of the "Chinese Soviet Republic," and the 
pansion and effectiveness of the Communist forces became a serious 
nace to the Nanking government.47 
46Ibid., PP• 140-14].. 
47Ibid., P• 90. 
CH.APrER II 
THE STROOGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
In 1930 one hundred eighty-one administrative districts of 
rl.na were under Conununist administration, highly concentrated in 
Langsi province, and extending into Hupeh, Kwangtung, Hunan, Fukien,, 
rangsi, Szechuan, Honan, and Anhwei provinces.1 The revolutionary 
>tentialities of these soviets troubled Chiang Kai-shek so much that 
~ resolved to eradicate the Chinese Communists by force. He 
:1.unched his first anti-Communist campaign in December, 1930, with 
1 army of about one hundred thousand men under the command of General 
1 Ti-ping. 2 The Chinese Communists mobilized a total of about 
lirty thousand men to meet the Nationalist troops.3 
In this campaign the Communist military coilll'llanders adopted guerrilla 
actics, attacking each unit of Nationalist troops separately.4 The 
i.ghteenth and fiftieth divisions of Uationalist troops were crushed 
"f the Red armies, while General Chang Hui-tsan, the commander of the 
Lghteenth division of the Nationalist Army, was captured and 
icecuted, and many of the government soldiers deserted to the 
:>mmunists .5 
1Victor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets (New York, 1934), p. 90. 
2Ibid., P• 100. 
Ji.ierbert Treadwell Wade, The New International Year Book - 1930 
~ew York, 1931), p. 170. 
Lo. M. Green, T'ne Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945). p. 142. 
5Harry Gannes, When China Unites (New York, 1937), p. 135. 
lb 
The first anti-Communist campaign lasted until the end of 
bruary, 19.31, and ended in complete failure. General Tai Yueh, one 
the brigadiers under General Lu Ti-ping, in his conunent on the 
.rst campaign, said: 
There are six reasons for the failure of the campaign: 
(1) The government forces ••• were ordered away before the 
territory was cleared of Communist bandits, giving them 
opportunity to come up again; (2) The government forces were 
unacquainted with the geography of the territory, the 
organization of the soviets, and the strength of the soviet 
forces; (3) The different units of government forces were 
reluctant to cooperate with each other, each trying to pass 
the responsibility to others; (4) The mismanagement and 
incompetence of the hsien (county) magistrates; the 
inefficiency of the police, who disturbed people instead 
of protecting them, the local gentry who fattened themselves 
on the people by oppressing them, combined to drive the 
people to the arms of the Communists; (5) The lack of 
cooperation among the party, govenunent, military authorities 
and people in their co:rmnon effort to put down the Communist 
bandits; (6) The bankrupt condition of the peasantry, unemploy-
ment among the artisans and workers, and the general economic 
distress among the people, supply inexhaustible fuel to the 
growth of Cormnunism.6 · 
In May of 1931 the Nanking government started its second anti-
>mmunist campaign. An army of about two htmdred thousand under the 
mun.and of the Minister of War, Ho Ying-ching, moved into the soviet 
~eas by seven routes. The Communist comman:iers still clung to the 
lctics of guerrilla warfare. :F'irst the Comrnunists dispersed their 
inies before the advancing Nationalist troops into the mountain 
~gions, where they concEl'ltrated their defenses and attacked the 
1olated divisions of Nationalist troops. As a result, portions of 
1e Nationalist troops were destroyed, while others retreated and 
!re re-grouped. 7 
6Yakhontoff, .£E• cit., PP• 100-102. 
7Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 19.38), pp. 163-164. 
On July 2, 1931, the Nanking government began its third anti-
munist campaign with an army of three hurrlred thousand men under 
.l:( 
e personal. command of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was assisted by 
Ying-ching, Sun Lien-chun, and Chen ?A..in-su, each of whom had charge 
a main route of advance. After two weeks of fighting, with 
tionalist air forces participating, the Red armies retreated to the 
untains. Nationalist troops occupied such strategic points as 
ngku, Kwangchan, Hsinkuo and Yuitu. In August, heavy rains forced 
e Nationalist armies to stop their advance into the roadless mountain 
stricts, bringing the campaign to a standstill. 
In September, 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria shook 
t.ional.ist morale, and the Red amies, seizing this opportunity, 
arted an advance of their own, and reoccupied Ningtu, Kwangchan, 
inkuo, and Tungku. Many Nationalist soldiers and large amounts of 
nunition, guns and equipment were captured, forcing Chiang Kai-shek 
withdraw his troops.a 
In March, 1932, the Chinese Communists launched a counter-
f'ensive, and in April occupied the important town of Chanchow, in 
~ien, not far from Amoy; in the south, the Red armies attacked 
en Chi-tang, warlord of Kwantung, at Nan Hsiang; while on the Kiangsi 
mt they attacked Lo An, Li Chuan, Chien Ming and Tan Ning.9 
In July, the Nanld.ng government issued a proclamation inviting 
e Red soldiers to desert their ranks. The proclamation read as 
Llows: 
(1) Every one deserting the Red armies and joining the 
ranks of the Kuomintang shall receive a reward. If he comes 
8Yakhontoff, 2E• £!!•, PP• 103-107. 
9snow, 2.E• ~., p. 165. 
with his rifle he is entitled to 20 dollars; if with a 
Mauser to 30 dollars; with a machine-gun to 300 dollars. 
Those coming without any arms shall receive 5 dollars. 
(2) Every one who joins the Kuomintang after having killed 
a colonel of a Red regiment shall receive a reward of 
500 dollars. For the assassination of a division commander 
or a brigadier one gets 5,000 dollars. For killing a chief 
of a battalion the reward is 300 dollars. For a commissar 
of an army corps 3,000. (3) Every one who joins the 
Kuomintang and brings with him as a prisoner a company or 
battalion commander of the Red Army shall receive 500 
dollars. For a regiment colonel or brigadier the reward 
is 1,000 dollars. For a division or corps commander, 2,000. 
For the army leaders or various commissars, 10,000. For the 
army commander or for the commander-in-chief, 30,000. 
(4) We welcome particularly those who join the Kuomintang 
bringing their arms. We welcome the Communists who rep~nt; 
we welcome those who give us information on Communists. We 
protect the peaceful population, we send our greetings to 
the masses oppressed by the Communists, and render a relief 
to the hungry population of the sovietized areas. On the 
other hand, we forbid the spreading of false rumors and 
accusations out of spite and vengeance. Every one who 
comes with sincere penitence is welcome. We strictly 
oppose mistreatment and abuse of the peaceful population. 
Those who help us in our struggle with the Communists will 
be rewarded.lo 
ltl 
In August, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek.convoked a conference at Looshan 
which Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, and other prominent leaders of the 
omintang participated. Here the new campaign was planned to 
elude: (1) the formation of the Pao Chia system (the tithing 
stem), a kind of police system, based on the family unit to 
tablish strict control over the people; (2) the improvement of 
cal administration; (3) the establishment of farmers' banks and 
operative societies; (4) the stiffening of the anti-Communist 
ockades, and the regulation of all business in the regions adjoining 
e Communist areas, especially the selling of salt; (5) the construe-
on of roads adjoining the Conununist zones in order to facilitate the 
lOyakhontoff, ££•~.,PP• 248-249. 
.... , 
,ent of troops; (6) the utilization of all political methods 
L might help to corrupt the Communist Party and the Red Army •11 
In the spring of 1933 Japanese troops approached Peiping, where-
Chiang Kai-shek signed an armistice with the Japanese at Tangku 
LY, 1933.12 
In April, 1933, the Nanking government started its fourth anti-
mist campaign, the results of which were described by Mao Tse-tung 
1llows: 
In April, 1933, began the fourth, and, for Nanking, 
perhaps the most disastrous, of its extermination campaigns. 
In the first battle of this period two divisions were 
disarmed and two divisional commanders were captured. The 
59th division was partly destroyed and the 52nd was com-
pletely destroyed.. Thirteen thousand men were captured 
in this one battle at Ta Lung Ping and Chiao Hui in Lo An 
hsien. The Kuomintang's 11th division, then Chiang Kai-shek 1s 
best, was next eliminated, being almost totally disarmed, 
and its commander seriously wounded. These engagements 
proved decisive turning-points, and the fourth campaign 
soon afterwards ended. Chiang Kai-shek at this time wrote 
to Chen Cheng, his field commander, that he considered this 
defeat 11 the greatest hwniliat1on11 in his life. Chen Cheng 
did not favor pushing the campaign. He told people then 
that, in his opinion, fighting the Reds was a "lifetime 
job11 and a "life sentence." Reports of this coming /_si'i/ 
to Chia,-:iKai-shek, he removed Chen Cheng from the high 
command • ., 
In October, 1933, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized nearly one million men, 
adopted the blockhouse and fortification system, which was intro-
d by German advisors, then in the employ of the Generalissimo.14 
ccordance with the recommended tactics of the German advisors, 
ng Kai-shek built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands 
achine gun posts. This defensive-offensive strategy and these 
llibid., PP• 110-111. 
12Toid., p. 113. 
l3snow, £E• cit., P• 165. 
14china White Pa12er, p. 45. (One of the most notable German advisors 
.933 in China was the late GeneraJ. Von Seeckt, former chief-of-staff 
- - \ 
cs limited the effectiveness of Conununist guerrilla warfare. 
ermore, Chiang avoided exposi~ any large body of troops beyond 
etwork of roads and fortifications. They moved inward only 
cover of heavy artillery, air support, and tanks •15 The 
nalists inflicted great losses upon the Communists by pursuing 
tactics. According to Chou En-lai, the Red armies suffered 
sixty thousand casual ties in one siege, while the losses among 
ivilian population in the soviet areas were frightful.. 16 
'se-tung admitted that the position of the Chinese Communists 
nfavorable in the following statement: 
•••• With the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority 
of the Kuomintang forces, the Red Arr.rry was obliged, in 1934, 
to seek to change the conditions of its existance in Kiangsi, 
which were rapidly becoming more unfavorable. Secondly, the 
national political. situation influenced the decision to move 
the scene of main operations to the northwest •••• 17 
Unfortunately, General Tsai Ting-kai, commander of the Nineteenth 
, Arr.rry, revolted against Chiang Kai-shek and set up a provisional 
-nment in Fukien, in November, 1933. This new development forced 
1g Kai-shek to concentrate attention against Tsai, necessitating 
Leployment of the bulk of the Nationalist troops against the 
m insurrection.18 The Nationalist troops suppressed Tsai Ting-kai's 
11e in Fuld.en by January, 1934. At the same time the second All-
:1 Congress of Soviets was cmvened in Juichin, the Red capital, 
a it was decided to withdraw the main Communist forces from Kiangsi 
1 'snow, S?• .ill•, P• 173. 
16Ib1d., P• 174. 
l7Ibid., P• 166. 
18Mary A. Nourse, A Short History of the Chinese (New York, 1935), 
38u 
, the northwest. This withdrawal. was begun in October, 1934. 
•iginally called a "general retreat,• it later became known as the 
,Ollg March.nl9 Mao Tse-tung in this "Long March" stated: 
The victorious march of the Red Army, and its triumphant 
arrival in Kansu and $hensi with its living forces still 
intact was due, first, to the correct leadership of the 
Communist Party, and secondly, to the great skill, courage, 
determination and almost super-human endurance and revolu-
tionary ardour of the basic cadres or our soviet people~ ••• 20 
The success of the Communist strategic retreat reflected the 
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ieff'iciency of Chiang Kai-shek' s military machine. This inefficiency 
iS due to at least seven reasons: (1) There was a lack of cooperation 
:,tween the Nanking government and the provincial warlords in the 
riti-Communist campaign. Some of the provincial warlords, as 
overnors Chen Chi-tang and Ho Chien, ma.de an effort in the anti-
ommunist campaign, while the others, as Governors Liu Hsiang., 
i.u Wan-wei., and Lun Yan, were not interested in field -campaigning. 
2) There was no unity within the :military hierarchy, as each 
ommander awaited his orders from Chiang Kai-shek. As a result there 
ere delays that gave the Conmrunists an opportunity to escape entrap-
ent and pitched battles. (3) The Nationalists lacked intelligence 
eports of the Red Anrr:, movements. (4) The corrupt and inefficient 
ilitary officers could not encourage the soldiers to fight at the 
ronts. (5) Chiang Kai-shek himself often made grave decisions without 
onsulting his military advisors, and his evaluation of' Commwrl.st 
actics was often incorrect. (6) The struggle for power within the 
uomintang disrupted the latter's efforts to suppress the Communists. 
7) Although Chiang 'Kai-shek had concluded a truce with the Japanese 
19snow, 2£• ~., p. 166. 
20Ibid., P• 167. 
Tangku in May, 1933, the Japmese. continued their aggressive policy 
,ards China. This forced the !Janking government to divert attention 
Japanese penetration of north China, and gave the Chinese Communists 
iitional means to accomplish their "Long March. 11 21 
Although the core of the Red forces had been withdrawn from 
angsi to northern Shensi, the Communist bases in Kiangsi and the 
ighboring provinces of Honan, Anwei, and Hupeh continued to engage 
partisan activities. Lands were redistributed and taxes were 
5htened; collective enterprise was established on a wide scale; 
employn1mt, opium, prostitution., child slavery, and compulsory 
rriage were eliminated, and the living conditions of the "WOrkers and 
asants were improved; much progress toward mass education was made. 
1933, the CoIID'Jlunists had already established one thousand cooperatives 
. Kiangsi province alone. 22 
Mao Tse-tung, in his address to the second All-China Congress of 
viets in 1934, reported that: 
The soviet democracy is also manifested in the city 
and hsien councils which form the foundation of the organi-
zation of the soviet. Two years' progress gives us now 
better organization of the collllcils •••• The delegates are 
scattered evenly to live among the people so that they will 
have the closest relation with them •••• Any delegate who 
commits serious errors may lose his seat through the 
suggestion of ten or more electors, seconded by more than 
one-half of the whole electorate or through the resolution 
of the council meeting. 23 
•••• The eight-hour system is now universally observed 
in the soviet districts •••• In many urban and rural districts, 
there are labor-inspection offices which send out inspectors 
to examine whether the soviet Labor Act is violated by 
employers or not. There is the Labor Court for cases in 
21Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
22Ibid. 
23Yakhontoff, ~· cit., p. 260. 
which the emplayer is accused of violating the soviet laws •••• 
The soviet has absolute control of employment. All 
employers must go to the soviet for hiring workers. Unemploy-
ment relief measures are in broader practice. Generally 
speaking, unemployed workers can now get concrete relief. 
Village workers have their own farming land. The social 
insurance system is administered by a Social Insurance 
Bureau established in soviet towns •••• The real wages of the 
workers of the soviet districts has been generally 
increased as compared with the prerevolutionary period •••• 
The smallest increase is 32 per cent (carpenters) and the 
biggest is 1,450 per cent (weaving workers) •••• 24 . 
Agriculture in soviet districts is apparently forging 
ahead at a big pace. Agricultural prcxlucts in 1933 have 
increased 15 per cent on the average as against 1932 •••• 
Under present conditions agricultural production shall be 
the first task in the economic reconstruction of the 
soviets •••• The soviets must lead the peasants to solve 
such vital problems as labor, oxen, fertilizers, seeds, 
irrigation, etc. Here the organized mobilization of the 
labor force and the participation of women in production 
are of vital importance. The soviets must lead the 
peasantry in launching the spring and summer plowing 
campaign •••• To relieve the shortage in salt, nitrate-salt 
has been manufactured.25 
24:rbid., pp. 263-265. 
25Ibid., PP• 271-272._ 
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CHAPI'ER III 
THE "SIAN INCIDENT" 
In 1935, the Chinese Communists set up their capital at Yenan, in 
~ northwestern province of Shensi.1 At this time anti-Japanese 
3ling was spreading rapidly over the entire country, for the 
pa.nese had penetrated from Manchuria into the provinces of north 
Lna.. Chinese spokesmen of different classes and political creeds 
came more and more categorical in their demands that the Nanking 
~eITlment forge a genuine united front between the Kuomintang, the 
11U11unists, and the minor political. parties to resist the Japanese. 
e Commllllists begged Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to pursue a policy 
"national peace within, resistance to the outsiders." Chiang 
i-shek, however, refused to change his previous policy towards the 
mmunists.2 
In fact, Chiang Krl-shek appointed the "Young Marshal," Chang 
ueh-liang, to be vice-commmder of the anti-Commllllist troops, and 
ationed him in Shensi province. The soldiers under the "Young 
rshal I s" command had retreated with him from Manchuria. Known as 
ngpei troops, they hoped to regain their homeland from which they 
d been driven out by the Japanese. In Shensi, the "Young Marshal' s 11 
louenther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), 
15. 
2Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 1939), 
11. 
i'f and troops formed ties with the forty thousand Hsipei troops, 
manded by General. Yang Hu-cheng, the pacification commissioner of 
n.3 
In October of 1936, Japanese, Mongol, and Chinese puppet troops 
upied Jehol and Chahar, and began to invade northern Suiyuan • 
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. nese patriots demanded a war of resistance, but the Nan.king govern-
tt replied that extermination of the Communists must come first. In 
: meantime, the Japanese demanded that the Nanking government suppress 
! National Salvation Movement, which was led by Chinese lawyers, 
1kers, and professors. At the end of October, seven prominent 
1ders of the National Salvation Movement were arrested in Shanghai. 
Ls stirred up strong resentment throughout China. The Communists 
>k this opportunity to ask the Tungpei and Hsipei garrisons in 
:insi: ''Why don't you fight against the foreign invaders, for the 
Jner they are gone, the earlier you can go back to your homes and 
llages. After all, we are all Chinese; why should you be fighting 
instead of fighting the Japanese?" The words took effect. The 
ngpei officers petitioned the "Young Marshal" and persuaded him to 
in with the Communists tc support the patriotic demands for a united 
ont against the Japanese.4 
An American writer, Miss Nym Wales, "Who was in Shensi at that 
me, reported the situation in Sian as follows: 
In Sianfu, the •Western Capital' of China, a critical 
situation is developing in the ranks of •Young Marshal' 
Chang Hsueh-liang 1s bitterly anti-Japanese northeastern 
3H. H. Chang, Chiang Kai-ahek (New York, 1944), p. 243. 
4Ibid., p. 244. (National Salvation Movement was a kind of 
ttrio'tic" movement. Its organization, National Salvation Association, 
1.8 established in May, 1936. It advocated the cessation of civil war 
ad urged national resistance to Japanese aggression.) 
army, stationed here for suppression of the Reds. These 
troops, dwindled from 250,000 men in 1931 to 130,000 at 
present, are all men without a country, homesick, sick of 
civil war, and in a high temper against the continued non-
resistance policy of the Nanking government towards Japan. 
The attitude of the lower rank and file might very easily 
be described a.s mutinous, and this feeling has permeated 
even to the high officers. This condition has given rise 
to rumours that even Chang Hsueh-liang' s previously good 
personal relations with Chiang Kai-shek have become strained, 
and that he is planning an alliance with the Red Arrrry in an 
anti-Japanese united front, qnder the direction of a 
national defence government.5 
In October, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian to launch his sixth 
:.i-Communist campaign. Twenty divisions were to be sent into the 
:-thwest, while ten well equipped divisions were concentrated near 
1gkwan, the gateway to Shensi. One hundred bombers were prepared 
support the drive to destroy the remaining Communists. Upon the 
1eralissimo1 s arrival Marshal Chang Hsueh-lisng handed a petition 
Chiang Kai-shek which stated: 
In order to control our troops, we should keep Olll' 
promise to them that whenever the chance comes they will 
be allowed to carry out their desire of fighting the enemy. 
Otherwise, they will regard not only myself, but also Your 
Excellency, as a cheat, and thus will no longer obey us. 
Please give us the order to mobilize at least a part, if 
not the whole, of the Tungpei army, to march :immediately 
to Suiyuan as enforcements to those who are fulfilling their 
sacred mission of fighting Japanese imperialism there. If 
so, I, as well as my troops of more than 100,000, shall 
follow Your Excellency's leadership to the end.6 
Stubbornly Chiang Kai-shek rejected Chang Hsueh-liang•s suggestion 
.d insisted that the Tungpei and Hsipei armies fight the Communists. 
,ang Hsueh-liang was ,extremely disappointed at Chiang's intransigence, 
d he related to William Henry Donald, an AustraliBl'l advisor to 
dang Kai-shek: 
5Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), pp. 396-397. 
6Ibid., PP• 399-400. 
I told Chiang to accept a Communist offer to join 
forces and fight the Japanese., but Chiang said: "I have 
given orders, you and every one else must obey. 117 
Chang Hsueh-liang also told Donald: 
My nen would not fight the Communists. It is not 
Communist bullets they are afraid of. They listen to what 
the Conununists say to then1 and the Communists say., "We are 
Chinese and you are Chinese; why do you fight with us; 
your officers get rich. They don't pay your wages • They 
have their motorcars, their concubines., their silk gowns 
and you get nothing." Every thing they say, of course, is 
quite true, but what can I dg? Old Man Chiang says we have 
got to fight the Communists. 
In November, General Hu Tsung-nan•s army, composed of picked 
,ionalist troops, was heavily defeated by the Red Army in Kansu 
1vince. Chiang Kai-shek became incensed and resolved again to 
:troy the Comrnuni.s ts. 9 
On December 4, Chiang arrived at TW1gkwan and sUillll1oned the 
Jlll&nders of the anti-Communist troops from Shensi and Kansu to 
l.f er with him. He told his generals that the anti-Communist cam-
.. gn was to be definitive. If they would carry out his orders and 
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~ht on with courage, all would be over in a few days and the govern-
1t could then direct its attention against the Japanese.IO 
On December 8., Chiang returned to Sian by plane, but by this time 
~ commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei troops had secret:cy- made a 
11ce with the Red Anny. Chiang Kai-shek had knowledge of this, but 
thought that he could alter their decision by a personal appeal. 
on his arrival in Sian, Chiang Kai-shek summoned a general staff 
7Earl Albert Selle, Donald of China (New York, 19L8), pp. 318-319. 
8Ibid., P• 318. 
9chang, 2.E• ill•, P• 244. 
lOibid • ., p. 245'. 
~erence to which nx>st of the prominent military leaders of the 
dntang were invited. An anti-ColTIJllunist campaign was proposed, to 
:h Chang Hsueh-liang and other commanders displayed obedience and 
tl.ty. It was rumored that if the "Young Marshal" disagreed with 
Generalissimo's plan, his Tungpei troops would be disarmed by 
dng forces, that Chang Hsueh-liang himself would be dismissed 
n his command, and that General Chiang Ting-wen, Chiang Kai~shek 1s 
trusted lieutenant, would be appointed to replace Chang Hsueh-liang 
h.ead of the Bandit Suppressing CommisSion.ll 
Two days after Chiang Kai-shek1s arrival at Lintung, outside of 
n, thousands of Sian students and school children staged an anti-
anese demonstration. They planned to petition Generalissimo Chiang 
end the civil war and reinforce General Fu Tso-yi•s armies .facing 
: Japanese in Suiyuan. Acting upon orders from the Shensi governor, 
, received his instructions fran the Generalissimo, the police fired 
,n the student demonstrators, wounding many of them.12 Chang Hsueh-
Lng intervened at this point, stopped the fighting, and persuaded the 
tdents to return to the city. That night the "Young Marshal" 
;empted to speak to Chiang, but Chiang Kai-shek was very angry and 
:used the "Young Marshal" of supporting. the student demonstration~ 
December 11, the "Young Marshal," in company with General Yang 
•Cheng, again tried to open conversations with Chiang, but Chiang 
L-shek pounded the table and cursed Chang Hsueh-liang.13 
11Ibid., pp. 244-245. (The Bandit Suppressing Commission was a 
litary organization which directed. the efforts to suppress the Red 
my.) 
12Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943),.p. 140. 
13selle, ££· cit., p. 323. 
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When Chang Hsueh-liang returned·to his Sian headquarters, he told 
officers, "I em afraid this may mean the end of my association 
1 the Generalissimo. I cannot stand for such disgraceful treatment." 
~ral Yang Hu-cheng suggested,· "There may be a way out. I will 
1g him into the city, and th en he will have to listen to what we 
nl4 
' 
On the night of Decanber 11, Chang Hsueh-liang, General Yang 
lheng and their staff officers held a conference at which time they 
Lded to arrest Chiang Kai-shek. Yar.g Hu-cheng' s army was ordered 
!OVe into the environs of Sian, and Chang Hsueh-liang sent his 
jain, Sun Ming-chiu, with hum reds of Tungpei soldiers to surround 
temple at Lintung. They assaulted the Generalissimo's residence 
lawn, killing the Generalissimo's body-guard. Chiang Kai-shek 
tht to escape into the hills, but was. discovered and brought back 
>ian.15 
On December 12, the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies 
1ed a circular telegram, addressed to the Nanking government, to 
Lous provincial leaders, and to the people. In this circulr 
1gran they proposed eight demands to Generalissimo Chiang for the 
1ervation of the nation, and "requested" the Generalissimo to 
dn in Sian for the time being, giving assurances for his personal 
1ty. The eight demands were: 
1. Reorganization of the Nanking goveri1ment, and admission of 
all p;;;.rties to shoulder the responsibilities of national 
salvation. 
2. Cessation of civil warfare. 
l4Ibid., P• 324. 
l5smedley., .5?£• cit., p. ll.il. 
3. Immediate release of the leaders of patriotic groups who 
were arrested in Shanghai. 
4. Release of poll tical prisoners throughout the country. 
5. Guarantee of the people 's 1i berty of assembly. 
6. Assuraroe of freedom to the people to carry out patriotic 
movements. 
7. Faithful execution of the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 
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8. Calling a conference for national salvation without delay.16 
These eight points were approved by the Chinese Communists, for 
;he day following Chiang Kai-shek's arrest, the Communist repre-
;atives, Chou En-lai, political director of the Red Army, and 
Chien-ying, chief-of-staff of the Red Army, arrived in Sian on 
ig Hsueh-liang's personal plane.17 
Chou En-lai paid his respects to Chiang Kai-shek, and a joint 
~ing was called between the commanders of Tungpei and Hsipei troops 
the Red Army representatives. These three groups became open 
Les, and on the 14th they announced the formation of an anti-
mese army consisting of about one hundred thirty thousand Tungpei 
>ps, forty thousand Hsipei troops, and ninety thousand troops of 
Red Army. Chang Hsueh-liarig was appointed chairman of the United 
L-Japanese Military Council, and Yang H-g-cheng vice-chairman. On 
~ructions from the newly created council, Tungpei and Hsipei troops 
:id eastward to the Shensi-Shansi and Shensi-Honan borders, while 
Red Arney pushed southward along the Shensi border.18 
When news of the uprising reached Nanking on December 12, it was 
:>red that Generalissimo Chiang was dea:i and that Sian was on fire. 
16 
Chang, ~· ill•, p. 249. 
17 46 Smedley, .2£• ~., P• 1 • 
l8~r1n·r.r_ mL ,..;+. __ nn_ J107-L08_ 
central government committee held an emergency meeting, ordering 
arrest of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, an:l declaring a 
;e of national emergency. Believing Chiang to be dead, the 
.tical factions within the Kuomintang, such as the "Political 
31 
mce Clique, 11 the "Pro-Fascist Wh.arapoo Clique," the "Wang Ching-wei 
LP, 11 the "Western Hill Group," the "C. C. Clique," etc., began a 
i.ggle for power. General Ho Ying-ching, the minister of war, 
>orted by the Whampoo Clique, became the commander-:i...'1-chief of the 
li.tive Expedition." Government troops were moved toward Shensi 
rince, and hu.."lireds of bor.bers were readied tor action.19 
Madame Chiang opposed General Ho Ying-ching's punitive operation, 
sought desperately to find a peaceful solution without bloodshed. 
~ing to the 1 eading men and to the young officials of the Whampoo 
iue, Madame Chiang entreated them to refrain from rash actions. 
1 the warlords of various provinces, such as Han Fu-chu, Li Shan-
l, and Pa Shung-hi, urged a peaceful settlement, and disagreed with 
iral Ho Ying-ching's punitive operation.20 
On December 13, Madame Chiang secretly sent Donald, the General-
.mo' e personal advisor, to Loyang by air with a letter to Chang 
1h-liang, saying that she knew that everything he had done was in 
interest of China. Chang Hsueh-liang invited Donald to come to 
t, because he wanted to assure the Nanking government that Chiang 
,shek was sate and alive.21 
19chang, .2.E• E!•, p. 249. {Punitive Expedition was the name of 
military force which was designated to carry out punitive operations 
.nst Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng.) 
20sven Hedin, Chieng Kai-shek, Marshal of China (New York, 19~), 
.04. 
21seue, ~· ~., p. 324. 
When Donald arrived at Sian on December 14, Chang Hsueh-liang 
l him: 
My intelligence officers have informed me that Nanking 
has ordered Sian attacked. This means they want the 
Generalissimo killed. Either they Will try to do :i,.t with 
bombs, or they hope that some one here will be inflamed 
enough to do it. They are using this, of. course,; as a means 
to seize power. They have cut telephone communications and 
have ignored :my· requests to have them restored.22 
32 
After Donald had a conversation with Chiang, he told Chang Hsueh-
11:,·. 
't'.>. 
You must tell your people that their future depends upon 
saving the Generalissimo, that the lfanking crowd want him 
removed so that they can take his place. They will run the 
government and you will be rebels or outlaws. To avert that, 
to put the responsibility where it belongs, to sheet {si'i/ 
home the blame, you must save the Generalissimo at all cost.23 
Qn December 15, Donald returned to Loyang and telegraphed to the 
:ing government that Chiang Kai-shek was all ve and in good health, 
expressed Chang Hsueh-liang 1 s wish that Madame Chiang and 
H. Kung, the minister of finance, go to Sian. No one believed the 
,ents of this message, and it was rumored that the insurgents 
,ed Madame Chiang and H. H. Kung as hoetages.24 
On December 18, General Chiang Ting-wen, one of Chiang Kai-shek•s 
; trusted men who had been seized at Sian, arrived in Nanking with 
mg Kai-shek's personal letter to General Ho Ying-ching, the 
Lster of war, that ordered him to stop the punitive operation. On 
following da;,y T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, and 
:!ral Ku Tsu-tung, one of the prominent military leaders., went by 
22Ibid., P• 32,5. 
2.3Ibid., p. 327. 
2~edin, .2,E• cit • ., P• 106. 
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ane to Sian. On the 22nd., Madame Chiang., accompanied by Donald and 
neral Chiang Ting-wen., new to Sian.25 After Madame Chiang's 
rival., conversations continued between Madame Chiang., T. V. Soong, 
:iald., Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng., and Chou 
-lai. What went on at these talks remains a mystery. But finaJJ.y 
ang Hsueh-liang., Yang Hu-cheng., and Chou En-lai agreed upon terms 
r the Generalissimo's release.26 
Before leaving Sian for :fanking on Christmas Eve of 1936, Chiang 
Livered a lecture to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng in which he 
)hasized that: 
•••• The present outcome of the coup d'etat shows that 
you are both ready to correct your own mistakes, and that 
is creditable to you as well as auguring a bright future for 
the Chinese race. Since you are now so convinced by my 
sincerity towards you that you have the courage to acknowl-
edge your wrong-doing., you are entitled to remain as my 
subordinates. Furthermore., since you can be so readily 
converted it will certainly be easier for your subordinates 
to follow suit •••• The responsibility of this coup d'etat 
naturally rests 'With you two., but I consider mysell' also 
responsible •••• I have not paid any attention to my personal 
safety. I have taken no precautions on that account and 
have therefore tempted the reactionaries to take advantage 
of the situa.tion •••• ~f;y own carelessness was the remote 
cause of .this coup d'etat and gave rise to this breakdown 
of discipline •••• ! feel I am to be blamed and must apologize 
to the nation., the party and the people. A country must 
have law and discipline. You two are military officers in 
command of troops., and when such a coup d'etat has taken 
place you should submit to the judgment of the central 
government •••• our lives may be sacrificed., but the law and 
discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may 
be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own 
responsibility to the country and the central goverrunent 
will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is 
why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign 
anything you wanted me to give or sign while under duress. 
25Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
26stein, ~· ~·• P• 17. 
It is because I consider life or death a small matt~r 
compared with the upholding of moral principles.... 7 
34 
The day Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Nanking, China was swept by a 
~ging tide of mass feeling that engulfed the nation. People 
~ched, danced through the streets, and tons of firecrackers were 
)loded. When Chiang stepped from the plane the entire government 
~ned out shouting: "Long live the Gneralissimo 111 "Long live the 
>mintangl 1128 
The first official act of Chiang Kai-shek, upon his return to 
'lking, was to issue a statement in which he confessed his inability 
prevent the revolt. He then petitioned the central government 
be relieved of all his posts, and that he be punished for neglect 
the performance of his duties. The official reply from the 
>mintang Central Executive Committee declared that: 
During a period of great difficulty and danger you were 
able to maintain a spirit of grandeur and Olympian calm; you 
were able to show a large and magnanimous personality so 
that those who created the trouble became deeply and sincerely 
moved and at last repented. What is there about the episode 
to make you desire to resign from your posts, much less to 
ask for punishment?29 
Chang Hsueh~liang ret'l.ll'ned alone to Nanki.ng and sought judgment 
~ his actions, whereupon a military tribunal was convened by the 
Li tary Council to pass sentence upon the "Young Marshal." Chang 
1eh-liang was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and was deprived 
civil rights for five years. However, at Chiang's request, the 
27aeneral ai'Xi Ma~ame Chiang Kai-shek, General Chiang Kai-shek 
~w York, 1937), pp. 178-181. (Quoted from the Generalissimo's 
r1onition to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-ch~prior to the departure 
>m Sian.) 
28McNeil, £E• ill•, P• 12. 
29chang, £E• ~., P• 259. 
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1tence was suspended.30 Chiang Kai-shek., in his letter to the 
Litary tribunal., stated his opinion that: 
In view of his (Chang Hsueh-liang's) admission of guilt 
and repentance, the government must be lenient with him a,ud 
show a forgiving attitude so that he may lead a new life • .31 
Foll.owing Chiang's return to Nanking., the Nationalist troops were 
:;hdrawn from Shensi., the "Punitive Expedition" headquarters was 
>lished, the cabinet was reformed., and the "pro-Japanese" officials 
:-e replaced by a "European-American Clique." Chiang Kai-shek 
:,urned to his native home, Fenghua, taking Chang Hsueh-liang along 
:- safekeeping. The "Sian Incident" was concloo.ed.32 
What agreements had been reached between Chiang Kai-shek and 
mg Hsueh-liang, the Kuomintang and the Communists, are still 
mown. According to Chiang Kai-shek' s Diary From Sian., Chiang Kai-
~k did not sign the tenris that Chang Hsueh-liang had demanded. 
iame Chiang, in her Sian Diary, stated that, quite contrary to 
jSide belief, the Reds were not interested in detaining the 
1eralissimo.33 Edgar Snow says that the 11eight demands" were 
1densed into a six point agreem!nt that was signed by both Chiang 
~-shek and Chang Hsueh-lia.ng. The six point agreement stipulated: 
1. Cessation of the civil war and cooperation between the 
Kuomintang and the Communists. 
2. A defined policy of armed resistance against further 
Japanese aggression. 
JOChien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge 
;o), P• 107. 
31chang, op. cit., P• 260. - -
32Selle, £.E• _ill., p. 336. (The "Young Marshal'' has remained 
ler protective custody of the Kuomintang ever since.) 





Dismissal of certain "pro-Japanese" officials in 
Nanking, and the adoption of an active diplomacy to 
cement closer relations with Great Britain, America, 
and Soviet Russia. 
Reorganization of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies on an 
equal footing (politically and militarily) with Nanking's 
forces. 
Greater individual liberties for the people. 
The creation of some sort. of democratic, political 
structure at Nanking.34 
36 
Edgar Snow also indicates that an important statement was issued 
Chang Hsueh-liang on December 19 to the foreign press regarding 
i agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. This telegram was suppressed by 
~ Nanking censors. The important part of the telegram read: 
The Generalissimo's prolonged stay here is not of our 
doing. As soon as ¥..r. Donald arrived last Monday, and the 
Generalissimo had somewhat recovered from his natural 
indignation and his reluctance to talk, he calmly discussed 
the problems confronting us all, and by Tuesday had agreed 
in principle with the points we had in view for adoption 
of a defined national policy and the effecting of changes 
to permit the nation to develop logically and freely, both 
politica.J.J.y and materially, and in accordance with the 
will of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen. I therefore telegraphed, 
welcoming any one to come from Nanking to hear the General-
issimo's views, and arrange with him for the necessary 
safeguards to prevent the development of civil warfare. 
The Generalissimo naturally vigorously demanded that he be 
released to proceed to Nanking, but while I personally had 
full confidence that the General1.ssimo would carry out his 
promises, it was impossible to risk his being persuaded 
after his arrival at Nanking to continue with the 
warfare •••• 35 
Agnes Smedley, an American writer who was in Sian when the incident 
:urred, gave a brief description of Chiang Kai-shek's departure from 
m as follows: 
The Generalissimo was secretly released on Christmas 
Day. The people knew nothing of this, and the authorities 
34snow, ,£E• cit., P• 421. 
J5Ibid., P• 4l9. 
in Sian were apparently afraid to let them know. On the 
preceding day they deliberately circulated rumors that 
General Fu Tso-yi, heroic defender of Sui.yuan, was arriving 
by plane on Christmas Day to join the anti-Japanese alliance, 
At the rumored hour the airdrome was black with people 
carrying banners to welcome him. A closed car drove up. 
Out stepped Marshal Chang. He was greeted with applause. 
Then Generalissimo Chiang and his party followed; only two 
or three recognized them and then hardly believed their 
eyes. The whole party entered the plane and took off. 
General Fu Tso-yi did not come, and the people were left 
milling about in confusion. When the truth became known, 
there was consternation •••• Within an hour a group of young 
Manchurian officers and national salvation leaders were 
going from room to room in the hotel, complaining bitterly 
of the ruse. They stopped and said to me (Agnes Smedle,;y:7, 
-We have been betrayedt The Red6Arrrry induced the 1Young 
Marshal• to release Chiang 11 •••• 3 
37 
After it was all over, in January of 1937, Donald wrote a letter 
his old friend Harold Hochschild, concerning the peaceful settlement 
the Sian Incident in which he noted: 
•••• The ld.dnapping was on the twelfth, I left Nanking 
by plane the next day, got to Sian on the morning of the 
14th; heard the "Young Marshal's" story; cursed him; went 
and saw the Generalissimo and cursed all and sundry for 
giving so much trouble •••• The "Young Marshal" was not the 
prime mover in the matter, though he takes full responsi-
bility for it, and it came about that he was put in that 
position in order to save the Generalissimo and prevent 
harm coming to him personally •••• He looks well and does 
not regret anything, and is highly amused to see that all 
he demanded has now been agreed to. The chief thing was 
cessation of fighting with the Reds • The fighting stopped 
automatically and negotiatio~ are now coming to a head to 
wind up the whole business •••• So, in principle, the "Young 
Marshal" won out •••• 37 
36smedley, -22• ~., pp. 148-149, 
37selle, -22• cit., P• 3.36. 
CHAPl'ER IV 
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE UNITED FRONT 
Shortly after the Sian Incident, the Nanking government abandoned 
policy of hostility against the Chinese Communists I and Chiang 
-shek invited Chou En-lai to the capital. Negotiations went 
etly ahead and, bit by bit, the Kuomintang adopted a policy that 
ncided in all respects with Chang Hsueh-liang's proposals. 
itical prisoners were set free, and newspaper censorship was 
,lished.1 
In Februaxy of 1937, the Chinese Commur.J.sts sent an official 
.egram to the third plenary session of the Kuomintang Congress, 
.ting their conditions for a united front. This telegram proposed 
: following conditions: 
(1) Cessation of the civil war and concentration of strength 
against Japanese agression. 
(2) Freedom of speech and assembly, and release of political 
prisoners. 
(3) Calling of a national salvation conference representing 
all groups and the armed forces. 
(4) Intensii'ication of miJ.itary preparations to resist Jap&IJ, 
and improvement of the living conditions of the people.2 
The Central Executive Conmittee of the Kuomintang replied to the 
Lnese Conununists by set1.ing forth four conditions as the basis for 
1Ear1 Albert Selle, Donald of Ch:ina (New York, 1948) 11 P• 331. 
2Lawrence K. Rosinger, China•s Wartime Politics 1937-1944 (Princeto: 
+5), P• 23. 
ticipation in a united front, namely: 
1. Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into 
the national forces. 
2. Dissolution of the soviet government • 
.3. Cessation of Communist propaganda. 
4. Tennination of the class struggle.3 
.39 
As proof of the Kuomintang's sincerity, the economic blockade was 
'ted by the Nanking government, communications were restored between 
ionalist China and the Communist zone, and Nanking delegates were 
Lt to Yenan to review the local soviet administration and the Red 
ry. 4 
The negotiations toward unity proceeded with success, and the 
ununists promised not to refer to themselves as Communists. They 
•e willing to drop all claims to a separately constituted government 
l army, providing the Red armies were ~rmitted to remain under the 
unand of the Communist generals, and retain their own poll tical 
1cationa.l system. It was also announced that, in the interests of 
~ional unity, the Communists had al ready ceased confiscating 
Lvately-owned 1 md, and were broadening representation in the local 
riets.5 
By the fall of 19.36, meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiment had 
:ome widespread among the Chinese populace. Numerous incidents had 
:urred throughout the country. A Japanese druggist was killed by a 
> at Pakhoi, in Kwangtung province; a Japanese consular policeman 
3chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 19.37-1943 
,w York, 19L3), p. 50. 
4oeorge Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), p. 76. 
'Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China {New York, 1943), p. 17.3. 
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killed at Hanlcow; a Japanese officer was assaulted at Fengtai; and 
ee Japanese soldiers were shot by Chinese gunmen at Shanghai. In 
ly to these incidents the Japanese., in September., 19.36., demanded 
nese acceptance of certain basic demands as the price to maintain 
.ce.ful relations beween China and Japan. The Japanese insisted 
.t Chiang Kai-shek himself., ~nd not merely ·the Foreign Minister., 
ng Chun., approve the following demands: 
1. The acceptance of responsibility by the Nanking govern-
ment for termination of anti-Japanese agitation. 
2. The recognition of J apa.n' s special posi ti an in north 
China. 
J. Cooperation in the suppression of Communism through the 
brigading of Japanese with Chinese troops, wherever the 
ls. tter were confronted with Communist .forces of equal 
numbers., and also in the areas bordering on Outer 
Mongolia. 
4. The acceptance of advisers in all branches of the Chinese 
government, includi~ the military organizations:, as 
well as the civilian branches of administration. 
5. Economic collaboration, including the revision of the 
Chinese tariff down to the 1928 level. 6 
Chiang Kai-shek refused to discuss these dema.rrls with the Japanese 
>assador, and upon his departure to Sian in October left negotiations 
the hands of the Chinese Foreign Minister., Chang Chun. 7 
Following the "Sian Incident" a short respite in Sino-Japanese 
Lations occUITed. This was in part the result of political changes 
Japan., which brought about the overthrow of the Hirota government 
the beginning of 1937.8 In May, 19.37., the new Japanese cabinet., 
6iiarold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times 
iW York, 19Ll), P• 568. 
7T. A. Bisson., Japan in China (New York., 1938), P• 145. 
8~ • ., P• 569. 
ded by Prince Konoye, and supported by the army and the navy, 
ensified the militarist's strong policy toward China. 9 On July 7, 
7, during the course .of arnzy- maneuvers in the vicinity of Peiping, 
Japanese demanded the right to search the town of Wanping for a 
sing soldier. When the Chinese garrison resisted, shots were 
hanged, and a battle ensued at Lulruochiao (Marco Polo Bridge), 
ut fifteen miles southwest of Peiping.lo At the mountain re~ort 
Kuling, Chiang Kai-shek consulted his highest commanders on the 
stion of whether to fight the Japanese in earnest •11 
On July 14, in the face of active hostilities commenced by the 
anese, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the Communists to end their 
led revolt and anti-national propaganda.12 On September 22, the 
nese Communists agreed in an important declaration to the 
lowing points: 
1. The San Min Chu-I (Three People's Principles), enunciated 
by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is the paramount need of China today. 
This (the Communist) party· is ready to strive for its 
enforcemmt. 
2. This party abandons its poll cies of overthrowing the 
Kuomintang of China by force, and of sovietization, and 
discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of 
land from landowners. 
3. This party abolishes the present soviet government and 
will enforce democracy based on the people's rights in 
order to unify the national political machinery. 
4. This party abolishes the Red Anrry., reorganizes it into 
the National Revolutionary A:rtrry., places it under the 
direct control of the Military Affairs Commission of 
9Ibid., P• 570. 
10s cU 8 me fJY, 2£• ill•., P• l 1. 
llibid., P• 182. 
12creel., ££• cit., p. 78. 
the national. government., and ·awaits orders for mobiliza-
tion to share the responsibility of resisting foreign 
invasion at the front.13 
In addition., an agreement was signed between the Nanld.ng government 
the Chinese Communists on September 22, according to which the 
muniet base in north Shensi was designated the Shan-kan-Ning Bord.er 
ion, and the Red Army was named the Eighth Route Anny and placed 
mal'.cy' under the_nominal commend of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-~hek.14 
Eighth Route Army consisted of three divisions., totaling forty-five 
usand men. Another fifteen thousand irregulars., who had been 
rating south of the Yangtze River, were much later officially 
:anized into the Mew Fourth Anrt:r• The hard-bitten Communist, Chu 
. ., was left as field commander of the Eighth Route Army.1' The 
:hth Route Anrr:r was authorized to penetrate behind the Japanese 
Les in north China., following the withdrawal southward by the 
,ionalist armies, to organize guerrilla bands to harass the 
,anese.16 
Chiang Kai-shek welcomed the Chinese Communist declaration and., 
September 24, 1937., issued a statement -which praised the reestablish-
it of Chinese unity. In his statement Chiang said& 
•••• The manifesto recently issued by the Chinese 
Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph 
of national sentiment over every other consideration. The 
various decisions embodied in the Manifesto., such as the 
abandonment of a policy of violence., the cessation of 
Communist propaganda., the aboli tim of the Chinese soviet 
government, and the disbandment of the Red Army are all 
13tlosinger, 2£• cit • ., p. 97. 
~arrison Forman., Report From Red China (New York, 194S), p. 55. 
l5creel., .2,2• ~., P• 79. 
16auenther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945)., 
18. 
essential conditions for mobilizing our national strength 
in order that we may meet the menace from without and 
guarantee our own national existance •••• I sincerely hope 
that all members of the Cormnunist Party will faithfully 
and unitedly put into practice the various decisions 
reached, and under the unified military command that is 
directing our resistance, will offer their services to the 
state, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the 
nation for the successful completion of the Nationalist 
revolution •••• 17 
4., 
At its three hundred thirty-third meeting in September, 1937, the 
~cutive Yuan of the Kuomintang confirmed, by decree, the agreements 
lde with the Communists concerning the designation and boundaries of 
1e Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. This border region consisted of 
te hwidred thirty thousand square kilometers, and contained a. popula-
.on of some two million inhabitants .18 
In other decrees, issued at the same meeting, the Nanki.ng govern-
tnt permitted all political parties to enjoy freedom of speech, press, 
isembly, and values, provided they did not seek to overthrow the 
>vemment.19 
On December 13, 1937, Nanking fell to the Japanese, whereupon 
1e Nationalist govenunent retreated to Hankow.20 
In January, 1938, the New Fourth Army was organized in the area 
ist south of the Yangtze River. It was composed of peasants and 
;udents, some of 'ltlom were Kuomintang volunteers, and was placed 
1der the command of the Communist General, Yeh Ting. This New Fourth 
~ was recognized by the Kuomintang's National Military Affairs 
>mmission, arxi was assigned to guerrilla activities in the Nanking 
17chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction (New York, 1943), 
). 20-21. 
18 
Fonruan, .2!!• ill•., P• 56. 
19Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 
~39), p. 13. 
20sven Hedin, Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China (New York, 1940), 
:-ea.21 Also in January, 1938, the provisional Executive CoJl'lllittee 
~ the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region was established by the 
>Illllunist Conference at Fuping, following au~orization by the 
itionalist government. This provisional Executive Committee was to 
trve as the high conunand over the guerrilla bands in the three 
~evinces which were under Japanese occupation. 22 
..... 
At the beginning of 1938, the first Communist newspaper, Hsin Hua 
Lh Pao., was published in Hankow upon permission by the· Nationalist 
:>vemment; the initial expense was borne by the Finance Minister, . 
• H. Kung.23 
In March of 1938, the People's Political Council was established 
1 Hankow by an order of the emergency session of the Kuomintang 
:>ngress. Its creation was a compromise measure agreed upon by the 
1omintang and the other parties as the first step towards a united 
ront government. Seven Communist representatives were included in 
lis council, among whom were Mao Tse-tung and.Chou En-lai.24 Its 
~mbership was set at two hundred, 25 most of the DJ:m1bers coming from 
1e f ollow.i.~ groups: 
1. The Kuomintang and the unaffiliated masses. 
2. The Youth Party and the National Socialists. 
3. The Corrununists. 
4. The "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and 
the National Salvationi.sts. 
21Paul M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek {Boston, 
~41), p. 15. 
22Ibid., p. 16. 
2'L . 
"'Rosinger, .£E• 
24Ibid., p. ,o. 
2511nebarger, ~· cit., pp. 69-70. 
$. The provincial and ~icipal representatives. 26 
The People's Political Council was given three main powers: 
1. 
2. 
To consider all important measures, whether of domestic or 
foreign policy, before these were enacted into law by the 
central gover:runent. 
To submit proposal.B w the government. 
To question high government officials and receive reports 
from them.27 . 
After the People's Political Council was created in 1938, there 
.s a greater degree of political freedom than China had ever known 
fore. Co-operation and unity among all parties and groups were -
-
,paralleled. The council became an organization of national opinion. 
,wever, there was no definite rule that required all decrees to be 
Lbmitted to the People's Political Council for approval and, as a 
isult, the government was frequently free to act as it pleased. The 
iuncil became merely an advisory body to the government. 
In October, 1938, Hankow fell to the Japanese forces and the 
1tionalist government retired to Chungking. 28 Friction developed 
~tween the Kuomintang an:i the Communists early in 1939. The united 
~nt was formal~ maintained, although cJashes occurred between 
:-oops of the local warlords and the Connnunist forces.. The antagonism 
!tween the Kuomintang am the COD1111U1lists was due to various factors: 
1. When the Nationalist government established its war capital 
1 Chungki.ng, the right, wing of the Kuomintang becane suspicious of the 
)mmunists, and so~ht to restrict their infiuence and effe·ctive 
26 B ~-, p. 7 • 
27Rosinger, .5?.J?• £!:!•, P• ,0. 
28vinacke, ~· ~., P• 595. 
trticipatian in the war, beyond the extreme northwestern area. 29 
iring the two years of hostilities, the Chinese Communists had 
,read out and had set up soviets in the towns antl villages of north 
dna. Communists were also . working assiduously among the Nationalist 
•oops, seeking converts, and sow:i.ng dissatisfaction against the 
Lomi.ntang. 30 
2. The Communists represented a link with the Soviet Union. 
1en the Nationalist government withdrew to Chungki~, the main 
rternal source of armaments and munitions was Soviet Russia. The . 
. ght wing of the Kuolllintang feared that military aid from the U. s. S • 
. ght create strong tendencies within the Nationalist government to 
ctend greater influence to the Communists, as a political concession 
>r Soviet economic aid • .3l 
.3. After the Natianalis t government withdrew from Hankow to 
1ungking, Communist-led guerrilla operations increased in north-centra: 
1ina, which strengthened the Conmunist forces. The New Fourth Army, 
~ationed in west-central China, had also extended Communist influence 
~rritorially to the disadvantage of the Kuomintang • .32 
4. The Chinese Communists had formally announced their support of 
1e Nationalist govermnent in the fight against the Japanese, but they 
Ld not really give up their ultimate goal to bolshevize China. 
:,orge Creel quoted an important document, given him by U. S. Congressm 
alter H. Judd, on Jme 19, 1948, which stated that in October, 19.37, 
29Ibid • 
.30 
Creel, .2£• ~., p. 82. 
31v1nacke, 2.E• cit • ., P• S96. 
32Ibid. 
le month after loyal cooperation was ·promised, Mao Tse-tung issued 
te following secret directive to his followers: 
The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent 
opportunity for expansion. Our policy should be 70 per 
cent expansion, 20 per cent dealing 'Wi. th the Kuomintang, 
and 10 per cent resisting Japan. There are three stages 
in carrying out this policy; the first is a compromising 
stage, in which self-sacrifice should be made to show our 
outward obedience to the central government •••• But in 
reality this will serve as camouflage for the existence 
a.rd development of the party. The second is a contending 
stage., in which two or three years should be spent in 
leying the foundation of our party• s political and· 
military powers •••• The third is an offensive stage in 
which our forces should penetrate deeply into central 
China, sever the communications of the central government 
troops in various sectors., ,isolate and disperse them 
until we are. ready for the counter offensive to wrest the 
leadership from the hands of the Kuomintang.33 
5. The Nationalist government was annoyed that the Chinese 
LU 
>rnmunists were engaged only in raiding Japanese-occupied areas. The 
>mmunists had not contributed support in any of the major battles or 
1e anti-Japanese war., either at Shanghai in 1937, at Taierchwang in 
~38., in the defense of Hankow, or in the battles of Cha.nghsa and 
mgting Lake.34 
According to the testimony of Theodore H. White, the Chinese 
:>mmunists only attacked small groups of the ene~ when they had an 
pportunity. Theodore White wrote: 
During the signil'icant cam~igns it was the weary 
soldiers of the central government who took the shock., gnawed 
at the enemy, and died. During the campaigns of 1937-1938., 
or the eastern China campaign of 19l.i4, more than 70 per cent 
of Japanese effort was concentrated aga~st the troops of 
Chiang Kai-shek and his warlord allies.3~ 
33 · Creel, .21?• ~ • ., p. 80. 
34 
Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 202. 
35Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby., Thunder Out of China 
t'lew York, 1946)., p. 210. 
From the Communist point of view., the rifts in the united front 
ire due to the following causes: 
1. The Cormnunists felt that they had been unjustly treated. 
tey accused the Nationalist goverrunent of failure to provide arms, 
1dical supplies, and material support. They demanded legalization 
· their party and release of Communists imprisoned by the Kuomintang.3~ 
2. By early 1939, the Nationalist government had purged the 
>litical Department of the National Mill tary Council, which had been 
>rmed to unify all patriots, and to explain the issues of the war_. 
iou En-lai., the Communist vice-chairman, was deprived of all real 
motions, so that the Connnunists s~pected that the Kuomintang was 
>ing to restore one party dictatorship.37 
3. Early in 1939 the police_ began to raid bookshops, confiscating 
1blications that extolled the activities of the Communist Eighth 
>Ute Army and New Fourth Arrrry. Many branches of the National 
uvationist 11Life-Bookstore" and the Communist Party's "New China 
iblishers" were ordered closed.. Secret agents dogged the footsteps 
- ~a r writers, intellectuals and students.~ 
4. Free communication between Chungking and Yenan was gradually 
lt off. People making their way to the Communist area were arrested 
1d confined to special canps for 11re-education. 11 39 
5. The government troops began to b:J_ockade the Conununist areas 
1 Shensi., Kansu, am Ninghsa. In 1939, the Communists announced that 
3611china in Danger," The Nation, CUI {January 18, 1941), p. 61. 
37 Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China (Boston, 
~47), P• 123. 
JB~., P• 124. 
39Ibid., p. 125. 
.e Border Region was surrounded by several hundred thousand crack 
.tionalist troops, that over ten thousand blockhouses had been 
~lt, and that this blockade had reduced the Border Region from one 
llldred thirty thousand square kilometers to only ninety thousand 
luare kilometers, with a population of one million five hundred 
,ousand, that supported eighty thousand garrison troops. 40 
Following the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact of August, 1939, 
lO Tse-tung announced that Russia's understanding with Nazi Germany 
td strengthened the confidence of the whole of mankind in the 
issibility of 'Winning freedom. United States Lend-Lease was 
mounced by the Communists as a wicked device for imperialist war. 
·om that time on, the Chinese Communists refused to take orders from 
te Chungking goverrnnent, and renewed their declarations that the 
tinese Connnunists were social revolutionaries.41. 
In the fall of 1939 the Chinese Communists commenced operations 
;ainst the Nationalist government. The Eighth Route Arrrry moved 
,rward into the provinces of Hopei and Chahar, forcing the Nationalist 
Lrrisons to withdraw. Other Communist troops moved into Shantung and 
Lptured Tsinan, the provincial.. capital. .As a result, all three 
·evinces came under Communist controi.42 Lin Yutang described the 
,nnnunist Shantung campaign as follows: 
Over 35,000 troo:re of the Communist forces joined in an 
attack on the government commissioner's headquarters in the 
Seventh District •••• While the Japanese were attacking Chihsia, 
the 5th column ••• of the Eighteenth Arrrry corps took the 
4~orman, EE• cit., P• 56. 
41utley, ~· cit., p. 195. 
42creel, ~- cit., P• 82. 
opportunity to attack the Centra1427th Brigade and the 
county government at Chaoyuan •••• 3 
;JV 
Early in 1940, it was reported that Nationalist troops had 
,tacked the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsa Border Region and had occupied five 
,unties. The Communists appealed to the Generalissimo to intervene • 
. iang Kai-shek stopped the hostilities, but would not give orders to 
.thdraw the Nationalist troops. The Eighth Route Army addressed an 
,en telegram to Generalissi100 and all members of the Nationalist 
,vernment., stating that: 
•.•• Special [f.uornintani/ agents have been sent into the 
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to create disturbances., 
while huge annies have been sent to surround it. One day 
they raid a city, another day they sieze a county •••• The 
Sian-Yulin highway and the Lunghai Railway are communication 
lines of the Eighth Route Army. They a:- e dotted with special 
agents, and members of the. Three Principles Youth Corps inter-
cept and kidnap travelers.44 
The major controversy to divide Nationalists and Communists was 
le 11New Fourth Army Incident." Late in 1940, the Nationalist War 
.nister, He Ying-chin, had ordered the New Fourth Arrrry to evacuate 
te rich Shanghai-Nanking area and to move northward. The leaders of 
te New Fourth Army agreed to make the move., but asked that arrange-
ints be made for the protection of the partisan troofS that were left 
1hind. This arrangement was never made, arri., in January of 1941, 
.ghting broke out between governnl!!nt troop.s and the New Fourth Arrrry. 
t a nine day battle, four thousand of the New Fourth Army were 
i.ssacred by twenty-seven divisions of Nationalist troops. Two famous 
mnnunist commaniers, Generals Yeh Ting and Hong Yang, were captured.45 
4Ji.in Yutang, Vigil of a Nation (New York, 1945), p. 119. 
~gar Snow, The Battle For Asia (New York., 1941), pp. 354-355. 
45The Nation, CLII (February 1., 1941), p. 114. 
In January, 19Ll., the Nationalist· government formally charged 
,at the Chinese Communists had broken the united front agreement by 
1eking to establish themselves politically in the territories 
1captured from the Japanese, and by refusing to submit to orders from 
Le minister or war. 46 Chiang Kai-shek declared: 
In November, 1940, the New Fourth Arrrry was ordered by 
the high command to move north.ward to engage the enemy in a 
certain appointed area. It elected not to respond, but 
waited until after expiration of the period of time 
allotted, then to make an arbitrary move southward, 
executing a premeditated maneuver leading to an attack in 
broad daylight upon the headquarters of the 40th Division. 
This plainly mutinous procee~ing caused its disbandment as 
a disciplinary necessity •••• 47 
In reply, the Chinese Communists accused the Nationalist govern-
mt of seeking to destroy the New Fourth Army, and presented the 
>llowing twelve demands for settling their disputes with the Kuomint~ 
1. Immediate cessation of provocative steps leading towards 
an ti-Communist civil war. 
2. Annulment of government orders of January 17 (order to 
liquidate New Fourth Army) • Open apology by the govern-
ment. 
3. · Punishment of Ho Yin-chin, Ku Chu-tung, Shan kwan 
Yun-siang. 
4. Immediate restoration of Yeh Ting's freedom, and Yeh Ting 
to be reappointed commander-in-chief of the New Fourth 
Army. 
;. Return of all Mew Fourth Arrrry ammunition seized by- the 
government, and release of all New Fourth Army prisoners. 
6. Reparation for the wounded and dead of the Mew Fourth 
Arrrry. 
7. Immediate steps to stop the anti-New Fourth Array opera-
tion in central China. 
8. Termination of the blockading system along the Border 
Region. 
46Ibid., CLII (March 22., 1941), p. 310. 
47 6 Forman, S!l!• cit., p. l 2. 
9. Release of all political prisoners, including Marshal 
Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Hu-cheng 
10. Abolition of the one party dictatorship, and democratic 
reform of the administrative structure. 
11. The realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen•s principles, and 
obedience to his last will. 
12. The purge of all pro-Japanese groups • 48 
In March, 1941, when the People's Political Council was convened, 
1e Chinese Communist Party announced that its members would not 
;tend unless its twelve demands were accepted by the governmEllt. 
1iang Kai-shek rejected these demands and insisted that his military 
,mmand be respected by the Connuunists • Chiang Kai-shek made two 
mcessions however: 
1. That the Chinese Communists would be allowed to air 
their grievances in the council, ard to make any proposal 
regarding political matters. 
2. With reference to fears of civil war, that "at no future 
time could there conceivably be another campaign for the 
suppression of the Commtmists. "49 
Owing to Chiang Kai-shek's promises, and following discussicns 
~ld within the People's Political Council, the Communists gave up 
:ieir demands. By September, 1941, armed clashes had again ceased, 
1d the New Fourth A~ reoccupied tl'e territory south of the Yangtze 
Lver from which it had been driven by the Nationalist troops. However 
elations between the Kuomintang and the CollllllUllists did improve 
arkedly.50 
48Rosinger, 2E• cit., PP• 111-114. 
49Ibid., p. 39. 
50The Nation, CLIII (September 20, 1941), P• 238. 
CHAPI'ER V 
THE STILWELL - CHIANG DISPUTE 
Early in January, 19l.iJ., Lauchlin Currie was sent to Chungking by 
•esident Roosevelt as a special envoy to evaluate the real situation 
aside China. On April 4, Currie returned to Washington with a lengthy 
iport, which was to guide the President in determining the character 
td extent of United States military and economic aid to China.1 
The Currie report was not made public, but I.E. Stone reported 
tat Currie had been deeply in.pressed by the political. controversy 
tat divided the Chinese, and was disappointed that a large portion 
~ the money which the United States had loaned to China had slipped 
1to the pockets of highly placed officials of the Nationalist 
>venunent • 2 
On April 4, 1941, due to the Currie mission to Chungking, the 
mtral Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced that the 
d.nese government plained to reform its administrative organization 
1d personnel, and that intensive economic measures were being adopted 
> increase China• s power to resist Japan) 
In February, 19L2, General Stilwell was dispatched by President 
>osevelt to Burma and China to see whether a road could be built 
lirhe New York Times, March 20., 19liL, p. 1. 
2r. E. Stone., "Chungking and Washington," The Nation, CL 11 
lpril 5, 1941), P• 400. 
3The New York Times, April 4, 19l.iJ., p. 4. · 
.., .. 
:ross the Himalayas--the so-called Burma Roa.d--over which supplies 
.ght be poured into China. General Stilwell served simultaneously 
1 conunander of all American forces in China, Burma, and India, chief 
· staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and deputy to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the 
dted Nation's conunander in Southeast Asia. While in China, Stilwell 
ls independent of Lord Mountbatten, but was subordinated to Chiang 
,i-shek.4 
For a time General Stilwell cooperated with the Generalissimo 
1 mapping the strategy against the common enemy. Stilwell, in hi::; 
Laries, wrote that he found the Ga1eralissimo determined and forceful, 
iat Madame Chiang was intelligent am energetic. Generalissimo 
u.ang transferred supreme authority over the Chinese divisions in 
1:rma to General Stilwell.5 
F'riction and animosity developed gradually between Chiang Kai-shek 
1d General Stilwell over conflicting interpretations of strategy and 
ictics against the Japanese. The reason for this animosity appears 
:> lie in Stilwell 1s refusal to allocate American military supplies 
) support the main Chinese armies, since American supplies were being 
eed to maintain the blockade against the Communists in the northwest 
::>rder, instead of flowing to the anti-Japanese forces. High Kuomintan 
fficials believed that civil war was inevitable once the Japanese were 
efeated, and that preparation to defeat the· Communists had to be 
rtdertalcen regardless of their effect in prolonging the war against Jap 
4 John Fischer, "Vinegar Joe's Problem," Harper's CXC (December, 19 
p. 91-92. 
'Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York, 1948), pp. 80-
Stilwell said, ''When you consider their history and experiences with 
oreigners, this is really a handsome gesture that Chiang Kai-shek is 
aking. ") 
6Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 1939) ,~ 
Friction resulted when General Stilwell attempted to contact the 
mmrunist headquarters in Yenan, and when he sought to persuade Chiang 
> stop opposing the Communists, and to concentrate his forces against 
le Japanese. Chiang and the conservatives within the Kuomintang 
mtinued to follow their policy or containing and uprooting the 
:mmiunists in an effort to inherit the whole or China after the defeat 
~ Japan.7 Animosity resulted also from General Stilwell 1 s insistence 
1at Chiang Kai-shek reform the Chinese army and suppress widespread 
rficial corruption.s 
Finally, in the spring of 1943, when General Stilwell required 
munber of Chinese divisions to launch an offensive against the 
1panese in Burma., Chiang Kai-shek agreed on coril.ition that the 
ritish undertake a landing action against Rangoon. The British, 
:>Wever, argued that they lacked the ships far such an attempt.9 In 
ay, 1943, Generals Chennault and Stilwell were called to Washington, 
tiere Prime Minister Churchill strongly opposed General Stilwell' s 
and campaign in Burma, and gained the support of President Roosevelt. 1 
7Pacificus, "The Chinese Impasse," The Nation, CLIX (November 11, 
9.44), p. 588. (General Stilwell, in his diaries, commented on Chiang 
s follows: "The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of 
hiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps the country split is his 
ear or losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any 
bances or giving them a toehold in the government." The Stilwell 
~' p • .321.) 
SFischer, 5m. cit., p. 94. (Stilwell wrote in his diary: 
! jJ:ldge Kuanintang and Kungcbantang .LCommunist Pe:rti} by what I saw: 
~ Corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds. 
oarding, black market, trading with eneJI\Y. Camnunist program. ••• 
educe taxes, rents, interest. Raise production, and standard or 
iving. Participate in government. Practice what they preach." 
he Stilwell Papers, p • .316. ) 
9Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 47-50. 
lOibid., pp. 6.3-66. (Stilwell connnented on his defeat as follows: 
Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket ••• The Limeys are not interested 
n the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotized they are 
·""""""-- __ .,..,._ n "''"'- C!+.:, •.• ,.,, 'D-"""''""' ..,. ?nt:: \ 
;)V 
When news of thie Roosevelt-Churchill decision reached Chungking, 
iang and his generals renewed their opposition against the Stilwell 
rategy of using Chinese divisions to regain British territory from 
e Japanese.ll General Stilwell, however, insisted upon the Burma-
Lween offensiYe, to which Chiang Kai-shek replied that thirty 
risions could not be diverted from the Chinese theater of operations. 
~eral Chennault, commander of the Fourteenth American Air Squadron, 
ied w.i.th Chiang Kai-shek, for he, too, considered the Burma-Salween 
~paign as a squanderous division, and wanted to concentrate all . 
ailable air power to severing Japanese sea communications, a.rrl to 
ening up a seaport on the Chinese coast to supply Chiang's armies.12 
General Chennault, was quoted by the New Yoric World Telegram of 
ril 2, 1948, as having stated that: 
. The Generalissimo's position was that if there was no 
laiding in southern Burma to disrupt the Japanese rear and 
sever the lines of communication, the Burma campaim was a 
poor investment £or his slim military resources.13-
Because of Chiang's disagreement with his strategy, General 
ilwell developed an intense personal dislike and contempt towards 
iang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.14 
Early in 1943, President Roosevelt became interested in the 
inese Conmunists following the comprehensive report made to him by 
11aeorge Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), P• 97, 
12rreda Utley, Last Chance in China. (Indianapolis., 1947), p. 209. 
1.3 . 
Creel, 2.E• ~., p. 99. 
14n,id., P• 9.3. (General Stilwell described Chiang Kai-shek 
"thisliisect, this stink in the nostrils ••• training his lousy 
·oops, bucking his bastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and 
i, the Jovian dictator, who st&n"es his troops and who is the world's 
•eatest ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations." The Stilwell 
Lpers, p. 210.) 
1e United States Military Mission, arid based upon the accounts of 
isterners who had escaped from Peiping through guerrilla-held 
irri tory in December, 19Ll. The report noted that the Yenan regime 
LS efficient in its organization, and that it was putting up a good 
.ght against the Japanese. The report also stated that the Chinese 
>mmunists were protecting peasant properties, and had divided only 
1e lands of those :landlords who supported the Japanese.15 
;:){ 
During the summer of 1943, a group of American military officials 
1d newspapermen asked the Chinese government for permission to enter 
1e Border Regime held by the Communists. The Chinese government 
~quiesced reluctantly, and the Americans became convinced that 
,nan's four hundred seventy thousand regular troops and two million 
,o hundred thousand partisans were the best organized and best led 
~oops in China, and that they would be a most effective force to 
>pose the Japanese, if they could be supplied with modern arms. 
1e Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, declared that he would be 
~ry happy to have the United States establish a consulate in Yenan. 
to Tse-tung believed that, with an American observer in Yenan, the 
mngking government would not dare to precipitate a civil war.16 
In August, 1944, General Patrick J. Hurley and Mr. Donald Nelson 
,re sent to Chungking by President Roosevelt. General Hurley was 
LStructed to discuss military problems with General Stilwell, and to 
irsu.a.de Chiang Kai-shek to agree that General Stilwell be made 
tprerne oommander of all gro\llld and air forces in China.17 Mr. Nelson'~ 
l5Pacificus, ~· ~., p. 589. 
16Ibid. 
17 
Maxwell s. Stewart, "The Myth of Patrick J. Hurley," The Nation., 
.II (November 10, 1945), P• 489. 
ssion was to inform the Generalissimo that the White House was 
d.ous to see China emerge from the war as the first power in Asia, 
i that the American goverrnnent was prepared to make every effort 
industralize China. There was a major condition attached to this 
rer of United States support--namely, that Chiang Kai-shek first 
:>rganize his cabinet, eliminating all members of the reactionary 
Lque, and including representatives from the democratic groups, 
ether they were affiliated or not with the Kuomintang.18 
When Hurley and Nelson aITived in Chungking early in September.,, 
WJ,, they were accompanied by American Ambassador Gauss in their 
rst interview with the Generalissimo. This first meeting proved to 
a rousing success, for both Nelson and Hurley assured the General-
simo that the American government stood solidly behind Chiang 
rsonally, and that American aid would increase. All they required 
s Chiang's agreement to place General Stilwell in command of all 
inese armies. Chiang signified his acceptance in a formal letter 
Stilwell, and granted authority to Stilwell to promote, reward, 
nish, transfer, and reorganize all Chinese troops as he saw fit. 19 
is grant of supreme authority was made in mid-September, while 
panese troops were approaching Kweilin, capital of Kwansi province. 
ilwell flew to Kweilin to survey the field, and drew up a memorandum 
which he formulated tactics for the defense of Kweilin, and 
conunended a drastic reorganization of the Chinese armies. He 
sisted to Chiang that these measures be carried out immediate1y.20 
18Pacificus, ~· cit., P• 588. 
19Theodore H. White arrl Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China 
ew York, 1946), p. 219. 
20Toid., p. 220. 
A few days later, while Chiang was still considering Stilwell's 
norandum, a telegram was sent by President Roosevelt from Quebec to 
~eral Stilwell instructing him to demand that the civil goveinment 
well as all China's armed forces be subjected to his personal 
thority, so that Stilwell could direct the whole of China's war 
tential o The telegram stated that, in case of Chiang Kai-shek' s 
fusal, Stilwell should withdraw all American forces from China and 
t off all Lend-Lease supplies to Chiang. 21 
General Stilwell went at once to the Generalissimo's residence, 
ere Hurley and Nelson were being entertained as guests. After 
rley had read President Roosevelt's telegram, he indicated to 
neral Stilwell that the demands could probably be obtained if 
plomacy and not threats were employed. General Stilwell, however, 
sisted that the telegram be shown to Chiang Kai-shek. When the 
legram was translated, Chiang remained silent, but later he told 
basaador Hurley: 
Tell your President that I cannot abdicate the leadership 
of my people or the presidency of my country. If he insists 
on withdrawing American forces and Lend-Lease, we will have 
to do the best we can. We ha.ve been fighting for seven years 
and, except for Chennault's air force, we have received no 
aid from America to date. We will continue to fight to the 
end without any if we have to, but now I insist that General 
Stilwell leave China. I will accept another American general 
in his place, but Stilwell cannot remain.22 
In his reply to the United States government, Chiang mentioned 
at when he had accepted the United States I proposal of appointing 
neral Stilwell as his chief-of-staff', he assu.11ed he retained 
.thori ty over the General. 23 
2lutley, ££· cit., P• 21.3. 
22Ibid. 
2.3wbite and Jacoby,.££• cit., p. 222. 
OU 
At that time, H. H. Kung, who was.in America, asked Harry Hopkins 
at President Roosevelt planned to do about Stilwell. Hopkins 
plied that, if Chiang insisted., the President would remove Stilwell. 
ng cabled immediately to Chiang, who swnmoned the Central Executive 
nmittee of the Kuomintang to inform it that he had agreed to have 
American supreme commander in China, but that he would not accept 
~eral Stilwell as supreme commander.24 
When this news reached the American Embassy, Ambassador Gauss 
red Washington for confirmation or denial of the Hopkins story •. 
pkins wired back that Kung had misinterpreted him, and that before 
esident Roosevelt ma.de any decision regarding General Stilwell, he 
uld consult his chief-of-staff, General George Marshall. 25 
On October 1., 1944, Stilwell wrote to his wife: 
It looks very much as though they have gotten me at last. 
The Peanut has gone off his rocker and Roosevelt has apparently 
let me down completely. If old softy gives in on this, as he 
apparently has, the Peanut will be out of control from now on. 
A. proper fizzle.26 
On October 18, 1944., Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek were informed 
at the former had been relieved of his command and was to depart 
mediately for America; there would be no American supreme commander, 
d the China-Burma-India command was to be terminatect.27 
24rhid., P• 223. 
25Ibid. 
26Stilwell, ~· cit., P• 339. 
27Whi.te and Jacoby, ~· cit., P• 224. (Stilwell wrote in his 
aries that: "The ax falls. Radio from George Marshall. I am 
ecalled. 1 Sultan in temporary command. Wedemeyer to command United 
ates troops in China ••• So F. D.R. has quit. Everybody is horrified 
out Washington ••• The Politicians are in full command ••• Some of the 
ys here were confident that F. D. R. would st.and up to the Peanut. 
felt from the start that he would sell out. 11 ) 
V.L 
On October 19, the Generalissimo sent a messenger to tell General 
ilwell that he was being awarded China's highest decoration. Stilwell 
fused to accept it, and on October 20, 19l.i4, he left China for 
shington.28 Some of the reasons why General Stilwell was recalled 
re: 
1. Chiang disliked Stilwell because of the latter• s insistence 
at the Chinese Communist Army be equipped to fight the Japanese, 
d that the anti-Conununist blockade be lifted. This seemed to Chiang 
be part of a poll tical plot to overthrow the Nationalist government. 
2. Chiang had granted authority to Stilwell to command the 
inese armies, upon ~ich Stilwell had presented him with an ultimatum 
at had undermined Chiang's prestige. 
3. Appointment of a foreigner as supreme commander was an 
fringement of China's sovereignty, which Chiang was willing to 
cept; however, any wholesale reorganization of the Chinese armies 
uld have uprooted the nepotism and spoils system of the Kuomintang 
reaucracy, a reform which Chiang was unwilling to condone. 29 
4. Chiang and his generals believed that Stilwell had not worked 
.t any plans for the liberation of China, and that he was draining 
ina of manpower and resources for the liberation of Burma. 
5. In Chiang's eyes, President Roosevelt's first telegram was a 
ot, hatched by Stilwell, to reduce China to the status of an American 
lony. Chiang could no longer allow Stilwell to remain in China. 
General Stilwell was not a good choice to collaborate with Chiang 
i-shek, for his lack of patience, tact and self-control made it 
1possible for him to get along with Chiang. 
2aib.d 3L6 _!_•, P• • 
29Ibid., P• 224. 
Stilwell openly expressed his dislike of Chiang, who, as the 
td of the Chinese government merited at least formal respect from 
allied officer. His mission was to coordinate the military effort 
the allied powers in the Far East, but instead, "Stilwell treated 
Lang Kai-shek like a tribal chieftain. 1130 According to the testimony 
friends and admirers, Stilwell hated "paper work" and was a poor 
dnistrator)l He la eked diplomatic finesse,, and, while he made a 
>d field commander, he was ill-adapted to perfom his task of 
Listing Chinese good will in the common war effort against Japan •. 
)Outley, ~· £!:!:•, P• 211. 
31Ibid. -
CHAPrER VI 
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE UNITED FRONT 
General Wedemeyer was appointed to succeed Stilwell in November 
1944,1 BDi approached his task with more tact and less personal 
nity. He treated the Chinese soldiers as equals of the Americans 
d restored amicable Sino-American relations. By his masterly 
rategy, he prevented the Japanese troops from taking Kweiyany 
. December, 191,4.2 
In consequence of Wedemeyer1s arriTal in Chungking, hundreds of 
w trucks and thousands of tons of war supplies rolled into China 
·er the newly . opened Burma Road. The reorganization of the Chinese 
'Ilij'", the improvement of its food supplies, the raising of the 
ldiers' pay, and the tightening of discipline were gradually carried 
lt. General Wedemeyer was permitted to attend meetings ef the 
dnese general staff, a privilege not granted to General Stilwell, 
lt Wedemeyer 1_1ever was giTen the direct command of Chinese troops) 
WhJ did Generalissimo treat Wedemeyer with fuor? The' reasons 
•obabl.y were: 
1. Wedemeyer was strongly anti-Oo.lllDllDdst., and he left all 
11itical negotiations with the Kuomintang to Hurley. This non-
1litical attitude was deeply appreciated by the Nationalist government, 
1china White Paper, p. 76. 
2rreda Utlq, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 265. 
>?he Nation, CLX (March 3, 1945), P• 236. 
2. When Wedemeyer became commander-in-chief of the United 
,ates Forces in China, the Chinese goverrunent was able to receive 
'DIS and equipment from United States Lend-Lease supplies. General 
Lennault told Freda Utley that in 1944, General Stilwell had one 
l?ldred thousand tons of arms and equipnent stored at Kuruning, while 
Le Chinese were fighting desperately without benefit of Lend-Lease 
Lpplies, only a short distance from Kweilin. 4 
3. Wedemeyer often told Chinese officers: 
We are American and you are Chinese. We are different 
but we are friends and equals. I . want to help you for the 
sake of both our countries. I can not help you unless we 
are frank with one another and speak plainl.z. I see and 
appreciate your difficulties and doubt if Lsi~ I could 
have done better in your place. Byt if we .co-operate the 
situation can be greatly improved., 
In November, 1944, the United States Ambassador to China, 
.arence E. Gauss resigned, and Patrick Jay Hurley was app_ointed to 
Lcceed him.6 After Hurley became the United States ambassador to 
Lina, he arranged for negotiations to be resumed between the Kuomi.ntant 
id Conmnmists on the following four points: 
1. Recognition of the Chinese Communists Party. 
2. Incl'IIJion of Communist officials in the National Military 
1uncil. 
3. Inclusion of Communists and non-Kuomintang representatives 
L the Chinese cabinet. 
4. Unification of all military forces in China for the immediate 
,feat of Japan and the reconstruction of China. 7 
4ut1e7, ~· ~., P• 207. 
5Ibid., P• 269. 
6"General Pat, 0 !!!!!,, XLIV (December 4, 1944), p. 18. 
7china White Paper, pp. 74-80. 
On the surface., these tems appeared to be realistic., but the 
t1cial issue was whether the five hundred thousand or more men in 
e Communist Eighth Route A:nrry were to be absorbed into the 
t.ionalist Arr.rry. The Chinese. Communists insisted that a true 
al.1tion government must be established before they placed their 
rces under Nationalist direction. Negotiations broke down in 
:>ruary, 1945. 8 
In May, 1945, an announcement was made by the sixth Kuomintang 
ogress that the National. Assembly in order to inaugurate consti tu-
:>nal government would be convened on November 12., 1945., to approve 
e Kuomintang's draft constitution. This announcement meant that 
e majority group in the National Asseni>ly would consist of those 
Legates chosen by the Kuomintang in 1936 and 1937, that its members 
re not meeting to frame a constitution., but were being s~oned to 
proYe a draft constitution which had been carefully prepared by the 
:>mintang inner group. Under this draft constitution vast substantiYe 
i appointiYe powers were vested in the president, who was to hold 
rice for six years and could be re-elected for a second term. The 
asident was not to be chosen by popular vote., but by an elected 
~ional Assembly. 
The Chinese Comnnmists joined with the splinter parties to oppose 
t Kuomintang cQl'lsti tution, and demanded the establishment of a 
u.ition cabinet composed of leaders of all the political parties 
> were to hold a free election of representatives to a national· 
1stituent assembly. 
The Chinese Communists preferred to adopt a formal constitution 
i.:y after all Chinese territory had been recovered from the Japanese, 
8The Nation, CLX (February 24, 1945)., p. 198. 
vv 
d. when an untrammelled election could be arranged. The Yenan 
rnmunist government warned Chiang Kai-shek that the Communists would 
t participate in his premature and band-picked National Assembly, 
:i that they regarded his arbitrary actions in proclaiming the 
omintang constitution as a declaration of political war. 
Upon receipt of the deliberations of the sixth Kuomintang 
ngress, the Communist Party held its seventh Congress at Yenan, 
sembling delegates from the northwest border region and from the 
rtisan fonnations of central China in the summer of 19h6.9 
In July, a delegation from the People's Political Council 
titioned Generalissimo Chiang for pennission to send a good-will 
mmittee to Yenan. The Generalissimo agreed, and a seven man 
ople's Political Council went to Yenan. Its mission was to form a 
w Kuomintang-Communist Conmdttee that would resume the stalemated 
gotiations for political unity. At the same time, Generalissimo 
iang sent his premier, T. V. Soong, to Moscow to confer with Stalin 
the issues concerning the provinces of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. 
ong also sought to iniuce Moscow to put pressure upon the Chinese 
mmunis ts to accept the terms of the Kuomintang •10 
On August 14, 1945, China concluded a treaty with the Soviet 
ion, at which time the Russian Foreign Minister, Vyachesloff M. 
lotoff, told Premier T. V. Soong that Soviet Russia regarded the 
spute between the Chungking government and the Chinese Communists 
an internal question, and would not interfere with it in any way.11 
9T. A. Bisson, "Trouble Brews in China," The Nation, CLX 
une 2, 1945), pp. 621-622. , 
lO"Opening Door,"~, XI.VI (Jucy 9, 1945), pp. 39-40. 
llThe New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 1. 
Lotoff al.so added that Soviet Russia·regarded the Communists of 
Lna as a sort of farmer-labor group.12 
It was understood in the T. V. Soong-Molotoff talks that China 
lld have to make a ~ pro quo for the Soviet "non-interference" 
:!dge. The quid e, quo was the re-establishment of the servitudes 
:!r Manchuria that Russia had held prior to 1905, and renunciation 
China's claims over Outer Mongolia.13 
Of 
On August 26., the texts of the Chinese-Russian Treaty of Alliance 
i supplementary agreements were officially released in Moscow., 
Llowing release of an official statement by the Soviet ~overnment 
at it recognized Generalissimo Chiang Kai-s bek' s government as 
~re!IM3 in China., and, by inference., would withhold all support from 
:1 Communist regime of Yenan.14 The Treaty of Alliance and 
~plementary agreements contained seven parts. Part one-~Articles I, 
, and III-was a defensive alliance against Japan. Articles IV to 
CI., pledged that both countries would work together in close and 
Lendly cooperation with mutual _respect far their respective 
rereignty and territorial integrity.15 
Part two was a railroad agreemnt of 16 articles which united· 
9 main trunk lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South 
1churian Railway into one railway system under the name of the 
Lnese Changchun Railway. This railway system was to become joint 
12Ibid., P• 5. 
13Ibid., P• 1. 
14rhid. 
l5China White Paper, pp. 585-586. 
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operty of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic, and was to be 
16 ministered by a Sino-Russian administration. 
Part three.was an agreement on Port Arthur, by which the Chinese 
vernment agreed to joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base by both 
the contracting parties; that the civil administration in Port 
thur was to be Chinese, and that military fortifications were to 
manned by the u. s. s. R. Thus, Soviet Russia had exclusive right 
maintain its army, navy, and air force in Port Arthur.17 
Part four was an agreement on Dairen, by which this seaport was 
clared a free port, open to trade and shipping of all countries. 
vil administration in Dairen was to be Chinese, but the chief of 
e Port was to be a Russian selected by the Russian manager of the 
inese Changchun Railway.18 
Part five was an agreement on Manchuria that provided_that, upon 
viet occupation of the three eastern provinces pursuant to the 
viet declaration of war against Japan, supreme authority over the 
cupied zones of Manchuria would be executed by the Soviet military 
mmander for the duration of hostilities.19 
Part six pledged the Soviet government to give China moral support 
d material assistance in the fonn of military equipment and other 
pplies. This assistance was to be given only to the Nationalist 
vernment. The Soviet government recognized Manchuria and Sinkiang 
16Ibid., PP• 593-596. 
17Ibid., PP• 590-592. 
18~., pp. 589-590. 
l9Ibid., PP• 592-.593. 
part of China, and promised that it· had no intention of interfering 
th China's internal affairs. 20 
The last pa.rt concerned Outer Mongolia, and involved recognition 
the independence or Outer Mongolia within her existing bouniaries.21 
Upon the announcement of Japan's surrender to the United Nations, 
e Chinese Communist commander-in-chief, General Chu Teh, ordered 
s forces to seize the arms of all Japanese troops in their zones, 
d to assume the administration of all Japanese and puppet-occupied 
ties and commi.mication centers. This was an open challenge to the 
tionalist government, and it was abetted by the Russian armies which 
d occupied Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and northern Korea. Chinese 
nnnunist armies were able to penetrate and occupy the whole of north 
ina and significant areas of central China before the Nationalists 
uld assUJ11e administrative control over China. 22 
On August 20, Generalissimo Chiang wired General Chu Teh that 
e Communist forces should remain at their posts and await further 
struc tions. General Chu Teh ignored Chiang 's orders, pushed his 
oops into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, and neared Peiping and 
entsin. Gener al.issimo Chiang conferred with General Wedemeyer and 
th Ambassador Hurley, who arranged for United States air forces in 
ina to transport Chiang's armies to north China to receive the 
rrender of the Japanese garrisons. 23 
The Generalissimo telegraphed to Ma.o Tse-tung to come to Chungking 
20n,id., P• 587. 
21Ibid., P• 588. 
22 
Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 356-357. 
23nwan Wan Suit• Time, XLVI (A~ust 27, 194.S), P• 43. 
discuss matters in person, declaring, "This involves. our national 
Lf are. Please do not decline. 11 Mao Tse-tung replied that he 
llld send General Chou En-lai to Chungking to confer with the 
neralissimo, but subsequently agreed that United States Ambassador 
t.rick J. Hurley might accompany him from Yenan to Chungking and 
ck again. 24 Mao Tse-tung agreed to journey to Chungking, it is 
(V 
Lieved, because of the Chinese-Soviet Treaty, by which Russia agreed 
support Chiang's government.25 
In September, 1945, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking in the 
mpany of Hurley and, under cordial conditions, negotiatiomi be-ween 
e two party leaders were resumed directly. The Communist spokesman 
reed to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the national leader of China.26 
ter five weeks of conversations between Generalissimo Chiang al¥i 
o Tse-tung, agreement on fundamental issues was still not in sight. 
e principal denands of the Communist were: 
1. The Kuomintang an:l the Communists should avoid civil war 
d together build a free and prosperous China. 
2. A political consultative council representing all political 
rties was to set up a coalition government in place of the Kuomintang 
:gime. 
3. The National Assembly, originally scheduled to convene on 
,vember 12, 1945., to debate the proposed draft constitution., was to 
1 delayed. 
24Ibid., P• lJ+. 
25 · 
The New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 1. 
2611Reunion in Chungking," Time, XLVI {September 10, 1945), 
42. -
I J. 
4. The Kuomintang secret police was to be abolished, and only 
e courts of law were to order arrests, judge, and sentence. 
5. Political prisoners were to be released. 
6. The Communists insisted th.at they be pemitted to administer 
e vital areas they had occupied in north China. 
7. The Communists also insisted that they be allowed to maintain 
tact forty-eight divisions of their armies. 27 
The crucial demands were the last two, for the Communists would 
nnalzy recognize Chiang's leadership in China providing the key . 
evinces of north China--Jehol, Hopeh, Chaher, Shangtung--and the 
stern provinces were allowed to remain under the de facto control 
the Communists. Mao Tse,;.tung•s minimum demands were that the 
inese Communist position be permitted to remain essentialzy intact 
rth of the Yellow River, which would have divided China territorially 
to two regimes. Chiang Kai-shek rejected this proposal as being 
consistent with China's unity and with his government's recognized 
atus. 28 On the issue of keeping forty-eight divisions intact., the 
tionalist government insisted that only twenty divisions might be 
tained, which proved to be unacceptable to the Communists. 29 
In October., a Communist functiona~ named Li Shoo-shik, was shot 
d killed in Chungking by a Nationalist army corporal, arousing the 
.dignation of Mao Tse-tung., who new back forthwith to Yensn.3° 
During the Chiang-Mao conversations, United States Marines had 





en landed in most of north China's key ports and cities to receive 
.e surrender of the Japanese. American planes were used to transport 
tionalist troops to these cities, and as Nationalist and Communist 
,rces made contact, local clashes ensued and spread over the whole 
north China.31 
31china White Paper, pp • .311-.312 • 
CHAPrER VII 
THE ABORTIVE MARSHALL MEDIATION 
In December, 1945., Am:>assador Hurley resigned, whereupon 
·esident Truman appointed George Catlett }f.arshall to be his special 
tvoy to China.1 His mission was to mediate the strained relations 
· the major contenders for control of China., and thus., prevent the 
Ltbreak of civil warfare. President Truman announced that: (1) The 
dted States forces would remain in China to help Generalissimo 
dang Kai-shek's government to take over control of north China and 
mchuria· from the Japanese., but not to intervene in China's internal 
,rife; (2) Political unification of China should be arranged by a 
Ltional conference of all major Chinese political parties; if 
t.ternal peace were not established., China could not expect to receive 
dted States' loans and other assistance. 2 
When General Marshall arrived in China in Decanber, 1945., he 
llllllloned the Political Consultative Council., which represented all 
•litical parties in China. His second task was to establish a 
•mmittee of three, consisting of a Kuomintang representative, a 
1mmunist leader and himself as chainnan. Generalissimo Chiang 
,pointed Chang Chun, governor of Szechwan province., to be the 
~axwell s. Stewart., "Exit Pat Hurley, 0 The Nation, CLXI 
tecember 7, 1945)., P• 614. 
2cbina White Paper, pp. 605-606. (President Truman to the Special 
ipresentati ve of the President to China. ) 
,tionalist representative, while the Communist representative was 
1neral Chou En-lai.3 
By January, 1946, a truce agreement was drafted by this committee 
.d signed by the Nationalist government and by the Yenan regime, 
:ich became effective on January 13. This truce agreement stipulated 
.ree points: 
l. All hostilities were to cease immediately. 
2. All troop movements were also to cease immediately, except 
l Manchuria and south of the Yangtze River, where Nationalist 
,thori ty was unchallenged • 
.3. All lines of communications were to be cleared immediately. 
commission, composed of Nationalist, Communist, and United States 
rpresentatives left for Peiping to execute the agreement. 4 
The Nationalist government pledged itself to guarantee freedom 
· speech, press, and assembly. It agreed to recognize the legal 
,atus or all poll tical parties and to release all poll tical prisoners, 
.d it consented to promote greater local autonomy and to hold free 
rl general elections.5 
The second f'unctiqn or the three-man committee was to unify the 
.li tary command or the rival party armies. General iw~hall proposed 
tat there be a national army of' sixty divisions and a Communist Arni:, 
' ten divisions. The United States would lend direct assistance to 
iprove the organization and to equip both forces, and Generalissimo 
dang was authorized to appoint, and dismiss all officers. This plan 
3,'Hope, 11 Time, n.VII (January 14, 19L6), p. 27. 
4c~a White Paper, p. 137. 
5George Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), 
114. 
d.led due to the irreconcilable opposition that the Kuomintang 
1nerals made to any reorganization that undermined their status. 6 
Early in March, General Marshall returned to Washington to 
1port to President Truman. General Marshall reported that he had 
.ven the Communists a role in the central government with full 
iportunity for enlargement, and that truce agreements were staying 
,e 'outbreaks of hostilities between the Nationalists a:rri the 
,mmunis ts. 7 
f,;.I 
Late in March, 19L6, Generalissimo Chiang encountered resistal}ce 
•om the feudal-minded laided gentry and Kuomintang warlords, who 
iught to preserve the old system of conservative Nationalist 
.ctatorship. The reactionary wing of the Kuomintang sent a petition 
1 the Central Executive Committee in which it denounced the govem-
int representative, Chang Chun, :for having made concessions to the 
•mmunists. Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh was attacked tor having 
.gned the Sino-Russian Treaty of August, 1945. 
The Russians were criticized for having stripped Japanese-built 
Lctories in Manchuria of machinery. 8 Soviet Russia was accused of 
Lving violated her pledge to give moral support and military supplies 
u.y to the Nationalist goverrunent of China, by allowing her occupation 
,rces to hand over captured Japanese military supplies in Manchuria 
, the Chinese Communists. By furnishing arms to the Communists in 
d.s manner, the u. s. s. R. made inevitable Communist resistan~e 
:a.inst the Nationalist government.9 
6china White Paper, p. 14.3. 
7creel, .21:?• ~., p. 145. 
8no1ue for the Dragon,"!!!!!, XLVII (April 29, 1946), pp. 32-33. 
9Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947}, p. 2h4. 
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In April, 1946, the Communists occupied Changchun, which broke 
e truce agreement. When General Marshall returned to Nanking on 
r:-11 18, he urged both sides to order a total cease fire, but the 
~ionalist govenu~nt declined to accept fu.rther mediation, for Chiang 
i decided to use force to re-occupy Ch81'€chun.10 
On May 23, 1946, the Nationalist forces recaptured Changchun and 
ranced toward Harbin and Kirin. The military situation appeared 
be favorable to the Nationalists in Manchuria, which encouraged 
air decision to use force against the Communists in preference to 
:ompromise·solution as proposed by G~eral Marshall..11 
In June, General Marshall conferred again with leaders of the 
ral regimes, and oonvinced both sides to accept a fifteen-day truce 
order to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities in 
~churia, resumption of conununication with north China, and reorganiza-
)n of the armed forces. As these discussions prcgressed, neither 
:le was willing to make coocessions, particularly in the size of the 
spective forces, and in the organization of command.12 
In July, 1946, President Truman appointed Dr. John Leighton Stuart 
be United States Ambassador to China. Dr. Stuart• s job was to 
sist General Marshall in his mediation efforts .13 From July to 
gust, General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart offered a series of 
)posals that met with stubborn counter-proposals. Nationalist 
:>ops resumed their offensive in north Kiangsu, clearing the 
lOChina White Paper, pp. 149-150. 
11Ibid., pp. 155-156. 
12Ibid., PP• 158-159 • 
13creel, .2E• ~., p. 147. 
rmnunists from the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad and capturing Cbengteh, 
pital of Jehol province.14 
In August., 1946, General Marshall was beginning to admit the 
llure of his mission. He remarked at this time that: 
Both government an:l Communist leaders are anxious to put 
an end to the fighting •••• It appears impossible for the two 
parties to reach a settlement on these issues which would 
permit complete cessation of hostilities in all of China.15. 
In the meantime, Nationalist troops recaptured Kalgan and other 
rategic points in north China, whereupon Chiang proposed a peace 
II 
ogram that invited the Communists to designate a number of delegates 
participate in the National Assembly. A five-man committee, 
aded by Ambassador Stuart, would consider civil affairs; and a 
ree-man cormni ttee, headed by General Marshall, would consider all 
litary problems. Upon acceptance of this proposal, Chiang was 
ady to issue a nation-wide cease-fire order.16 
Chiang's proposal was met by the Communists with a counter 
oposal consisting of wo demands: (1) the National Assembly should 
postponed, (2) the military status quo of January 13 should be 
stored. The first demand was a refusal to participate in the 
ssions of the National Assembly, which was dominated completely by 
omintang delegates, while the second was an insistence that Kalgan, 
kden, the Manchurian coal fields, and the other Manchurian terri-
ries occupied by the Nationalists be restored to the Co11111unists. 
on receipt of a categorical rejection of their counter proposals, 
~ White Paper, pp. 174-178. 
1'Jaek Belden, China. Shakes the World (New York, 1949)., p. 7. 
l6cree1., .2E• ill•, P• 148. 
1 Communist representative, Chou En-lai, and his associates left 
iking for Yenan. Chiang becane determined to pursue the campaign 
fU 
extermination against the Communists, when the prospect of a swift 
.itary victory mom1ted from the Nationalist successes and the 
.ume of rnili tary aid that the United States was furnishing. Strong 
·ernment forces were sent northward to capture Harbin and Chefoo.17 
September, 1946, the Communists had mobilized a regular army of 
i million men, as well as two million guerrillas to resist the 
,ional.ist offensive that Chiang had unleased in northern China and 
lChuria.18 
General Marshall continued to urge both sides to agree on a 
tee, whereupon on November 8, 1946, Chiang issued an order instructing 
. government troops to cease fire and remain at their positions. He 
Lted simultaneously that the National. Assembly would be convened on 
'ember 12, as originally scheduled. He again invited the Communists 
participate in the Uational Assembly, and to appoint a spokesman to 
~ three-man mediation committee.19 In response to Chiang's cease-
~e order, the CoI1D11unists repeated their demand that the National. 
!embly be postponed indefinitely, and that the military status quo 
January 13 be restored. Peace negotiations were thereupon effectivel; 
:ininated by all parties and the Marshall Mediation Mission prepared 
withdraw. 20 
General. Marshall returned to the United States upon being 
17Ibid., P• 149. 
1811strategic A, 11 ~, XLVIII {September 2, 1946), p. 26. 
19creel, £E• ~-, P• 150. 
20china White Paper, pp. 685-686. 
tpointed Secretary of State, 21 and on January 7, 1947, he issued a 
ng statement concerning China, the important parts of which 
;phaaized that: 
In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has 
been the complete, al.moat overwhelming suspicion with which 
the Chinese Conununist Party and the Kuomintang regard each 
other. 
On the one ham, the leaders of the government are 
strongly opposed to a Communistic form of government. On 
the other, the Communists frankly state that they are 
Marxists and intend to worlc toward the establishing of a 
Communistic form of government in China, though first 
advancing through the medium of democratic form of govern-
ment of the American or British type. 
The leaders of the government are convinced in their 
minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in 
a government of the type endorsed by the Political Consulta-
tive Conference last January had for its purpose only a 
destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that 
the government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of 
the Political. Consultative Conference resolution for the 
formation of the new government and intended by coercion 
of military force and the action of secret police to · 
obli tera:te the Communist Party. Combined w.i. th this mutual 
deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of 
ignoring the effect of the fears am suspicions of the 
other party in estimating the reason for proposals or 
opposition regarding the settlenent of various matters 
under negotiations •••• 22 
I think the oos t important factors involved in the 
recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side 
of the National government, which is, in effect, the 
Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who 
have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost evecy effort I 
have made to influence the fonnation of a genuine coalition 
government •••• They were quite frank in publicly stating 
their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist 
Party in the government was inconceivable, and that only 
a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This 
group inclu:ies military as well as political leaders. 
On the side of the Chinese Communist ?arty there are, 
I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is 
2lnP\1lling Out of China," The Nation, CLXIV (February 8, 1947), 
143. 
22china White Paper, p. 686. 
(7 
vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese 
Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit 
of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has 
appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group 
among the Communists, especially of young men who have 
turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption 
evident in the local governments--men who would put the 
interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures 
to establi~~ a Communist ideology in the immediate 
future.... , 
The agreements reached by the Political Consultative 
Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking 
charter which then offered China a basis for peace and 
reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the 
Kuomintang interested in the preservation of their own 
feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention 
of implementing them •••• Most certainly, the course which 
the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months 
indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It 
has been impossible even to get them; to sit down at a 
conference table with goveznment representatives to discuss 
given issues. Now the Comnunists have broken off negotia-
tions by their last offer, which demanded the dissolution 
of the National Assembly and a return to the ndlitary 
position of January 13th, 'lillich the goverrunent could not 
be expected to accept •••• 
The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be 
the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the govern-
ment and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, 
but who as yet 1 ack the poll tical power to exercise a 
controlling influence.24 
General Marshal.l's report was clear an::l concise--the failure of 
mission was solely and exclusive~ the result of deep-seated 
.i tical intransigeance. 
After publication of General Marshall's report, the Chinese 
lllllunists made the following conunent: 
One year ago the people of the entire country welcomed 
President Truman's statement on China, and the arrival of 
General Marshall to mediate. But before long, the policy 
of American imperialism toward China was revealed in all 
its nakedness, while the policy of national. betrayal by 
23Ibid., P• 687. 
24Ibid., p. 688. 
UV 
Chiang Kai.-shek's goverrunent also·revealed itself in 
nat ffeE..7 detail •••• During the changes of the past year, 
not only did the Kuomintang reactionary clique incite 
ci'Vil war and tear up the PCC decisions, but even the 
American mediator who signed the cease fire agreement 
never again referred to the cease fire order •••• 
General Marshall knows only too well that Chiang's 
National Assembly, convened last year, violated PCC 
decisions and procedure, but still he deliberately 
described that dictatorial constitution, passed by 
Chiang Kai-shek 1s assembly as a 'democratic constitution,• 
saying that the main points corresponded to PCC decisions, 
and that the Communists Party demands seem to have been 
satisfied. All this is specious talk •••• 2$ 
U.L 
The Nationalist government did not comment on the Marshall report, 
t on January 24, 1947, the Kuomintang submitted a proposal to 
erican Ambassador Stuart for presentation to the Communist leaders 
ich stipulated: 
1. The government was willing to resume peace talks, or to 
rticipate in a round table conference of party delegates and 
dependents • 
2. The government and the Communists should order a cease fire, 
lding their current positions pending a conclusion of the negotiations 
3. The government was pE'epared to resume negotiations on the army 
organization plm suggested by the mediation committee. 
4. In the contested regions, the govein11ent was willing to 
,mpromise on the issue of occupation rights with the Communists. 26 
The Communists rejected Chiang's proposals, insisting that the 
.litary position of January 13, 1946, be restored, arxl that the draft 
•nsti tution be suspended. The government again refused, whereupon 
1 January 29, 1947, A."'Tlbassa.dor Stuart announced that the United States 
Ld terminated its mediation. 27 
2Screel, ~· .£!!:•, PP• 167-168. (Quoted from English Supi5ementar; 
Services of the Communist New China News Agency, January , 1947 •. 
26 
~., P• 169. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE CIVIL WAR 
At the outset of the civil war the Nationalist troops defeated 
e Communist armies, and forced them to evacuate the large cities, 
ilway stations and fortresses. The Communists reverted to guerrilla 
1 -
ctics, avoiding open combat and large scale engagements. When in 
rch., 1947, Nationalist troops occupied Yenan., the Conmlunists 
tensified their guerrilla warfare.2 
In July., 1947, Secretary of State Marshall dispatched General 
bert c. Wedemeyer as presidential envoy to China and Korea to make 
appraisal of the overall situation) General Wedemeyer returned 
Washington in Septerrber., 1947, but his report was not made public 
til August 6, 1949. The Wedemeyer Report consisted of four parts, 
-which part one was a general statemant explaining that the situ-
ion in Manchuria. was serious., and that prompt action was necessary 
prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. 4 
General Wedemeyer recommended tha; the United Nations take 
mediate action to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, 
a prelude to the establishment of a trusteeship over the northeastern 
ln0ne The Great Wall," Tin's, XLVIII (October 21, 191.i>), P• 36. 
2"China Vacuwn.," ~, n.IX (March 3, 1947), P• 36. 
31'Much Need, Little Hope., 11 ~., L (July 21., 1947}, P• 15. 
4china White Paper, PP• 765-766. (Report to President Trwnan by 
eutenant General Albert c. Wedemeyer., u. s. Arnzy.) 
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0., 
>vinces to be administered by the Security Council. This guardian-
.p could be proposed only by China, but should the Security Council 
lect this proposal, China might request the General Assembly to 
;ablish a trusteeship.-' 
In part two, the Wedemeyer Report pointed out that ·although the 
.nese people were unanimous in their desire for peace, it was 
,osaible because of the irreconcilibility of the warring protagonists. 
1 Wedemeyer Report criticized the Kuomintang for its reactionary 
Ldership, its repressive policies and corruption, and the Conununists 
• being bound ideologically to Conununism and the u. S. s. R. 6 
lemeyer also added that the reorganization of the Chinese govem-
rt, in mid-April, 1947, had resulted in little change., and that the 
Lctionaries continued to determine al~ basic policies. 7 
Part three of the Wedemeyer Report concerned Korea, Trilile the 
1t section concluded that the Chinese people were not favorable 
rards Marxism, but only desired food, shelter and the opportunity 
liTe in peace.8 
Wedemeyer noted that the internecine struggle in China might 
~eaten warld peace, and that the mediation should be referred to 
United Nations.9 
In February, 1948, the Communists commenced a general offensive 
Manchuria that bottled up the Nationalists in the key cities of 
~~., P• 767. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
Bibid., PP• 765-773. -
9Ibid • ., P• 774. 
84 
kden., Changchun, Kirin, and Szepinkai.lO 
In April, 1948, the National Assembly was convened at Nanking, 
d Generalissimo Chiang reported that seven of the best NationaJ.ist 
visions had been decimated in Manchuria by the Commllllists. But, he 
ld his audience, "I guarantee, within six months, to annihilate 
l Communists below the Yellow River.," whereupon he was named 
esident by the submissive Assembly •11 
By July., 1948., the province of Shantung was almost entirely in 
mllllist hands, and late the following September, General Wu Hua-wen, 
mmander of the F'orty-ninth Army, and Wang Yu-wu, governor of 
antung province, defected from the Kuomintang and surrendered the 
pital of Shantung to the Communists. The fall of Tainan shook 
~tral China and precipitated the surrender of three divisions in 
ensi province. The Nationalist armies were demoraliZed ~d the 
eld commanders took the initiative . in ending the struggle. In 
1Tember., 1948, Changchun and Mukden capitulated to the Communists., 
iing the fighting in Manchuria.12 
The Nationalists were faced with a complete rout in the north as 
e Communists advanced unopposed through the Great Wall into China 
>per, advancing at the pace of sixty miles a day. General Lin Piao•s 
>ops advanced eight hundred miles within twenty days, reaching the 
liskirts of Peiping by December, 1948.13 
lO"Year of the Rat., 11 !!!!!,, LI (February 23., 1948), P• 40. 
1111Red Flowers for Father," Time., LI (April 19, 19LB), PP• 36-37. 
12Jack Belden., China Shakes the World (New York, 1949), p. 415. 
l3Ibid • ., pp. 416-418. 
In desperation, the Nationalists dispatched Madame Chiang to the 
ited States to plead for all-out assistance.14 But upon her 
rival in Washington, no high ranking American official was at the 
rport to meet Madame Chiang. Both the White House and the State 
partment refused to receive her •15 On December 4., 1948, following 
dame Chiang's arrival., the Chinese Ambassador requested 
3,000,000,000 0£ additional aid from the United States to bolster 
e Nationalist regime, and, in addition, the loan of United States 
rsonnel to operate the supply services of the Chinese Array, and to 
rect military training and strategic planning for the Nationalist 
rces .16 It was reported that Ha.dame Chiang had requested: 
l. An innnediate declaration of United States support of 
rieralissimo Chiang in h:iB fight against the Conummists., in order to 
prove Nationalist morale. 
2. Acceleration of United States material assistance to China. 
3. An outstanding United States military leader to d:irect 
i.nese troops. 
17 4. The $3,000,000,000 aid program. 
esident Truman had already rejected a suggestion to dispatch 
rieral MacArthur to China, while the other three proposals would 
re resulted in United States involvement in the actual conduct of 
e war against the Chinese Communists.18 
14n1ou Should Never Yield •••• ,"~, LII (December 6, 1948)., p. 27 
15The New York Times., Deceni:>er 2., 1948, p. 1. 
16The New York Times., December 5, 1948, pp. 1., 39. 
l?Ibid., P• 9. 
18Ibid. -
00 
Following Madame Chiang's formal reception by President Trwnan on 
i:ember 10., 1948, the Executive branch showed no indication that it 
s considering the Chinese requests., and on December 31 President 
llllJan indicated in a press conference that further aid to China would 
~ be considered until Congress re-convened, and that he did not 
:m to see Ma.dame Chiang again .19 
Early in January, 1949, Tiensin and Peiping fell to the Communists., 
lle other Communists troops drove deeply into the Yangtze Valley 
iards Nan.king. President Chiang was unable to mass the scattered 
>mintang remnants for a defense of the capital., which precipitated 
~oli tical crisis in the Kuomintang. General Pai Chung-hsi., 
nmander-in-chief in: central China., and Vice-President Li Tsung-jen 
:issed Chiang to -resign as president, while General Pai withdrew 
s troops .from Suchow., one hundred eighty miles north of Nanking., and 
1t a representative to Hongkong to arrange a surrender to the 
rnnunists • 20 
On January 8., 1949, President Chiang appealed to France, England, 
United States and the Soviet Union to mediate China's civil war, 
r. without response. On January 14, Communist leader., Mao Ts~tung, 
1ounced that the Communist Party would end the war under the 
lJ.owing conditions: (1) Punishment of war criminals., including 
!Sident Chiang and forty-two other meni:>ers of the Nationalist 
rernment. (2) Abrogation of the "bogus" constitution. (3) Reorgani-
:;ion of the nationalist armies. (4) Confiscation of bureaucratic 
>ital. (5) Reform of the agrarian system. (6) Convocation of the 
19The New York Times., December 31, 1948., P• 1. 
20Belden., 22• ill•, p. li4.5. 
.itical Consultative Conference without the participation of 
LCtionary elements. (7) Establishment of a coalition government 
succeed the Nationalist regime. (8) Re.form of the local adminis-
Ltion.21 
Such terms were tantamount to unconditional surrender and were 
ected by the Nationalists. On January 21, Chiang vacated the 
:sidency in favor of Vice-President Li Tsung-jen, ai1d returned to 
lj., 
: native town, Fenghwai, in Chekiang., while peace negotiations 
,tinued.22 AB a precaution, however, Chiang had already transferred 
0,000,000 of Nationa1ist gold, silver and foreign exchange from 
.king and Shanghai to Formosa., where it remained tmi.er the vigilance 
officials who were loyal to Chiang.23 
From January to April, 1949, Communist leader Mao Tse-tung made 
:pa.rations to cross the Yangtze River into south China wi~h an army 
one million soldiers that extended along a six hundred mile front. 
April 17, 1949, the Connuunists sent a three-point ultimatum to the 
,ionalists demanding: (1) An unopposed crossing of the Yangtze 
·er. (2) Surrender of all war criminals. (3) Formation of a 
~ition gove~ent dominated by the Communists. 24 
On April 20, the Nationalists rejected the terms, whereupon 
1 Tse-tung and Chu Teh, cownander-in-chief of the People' a Liberation 
ry, issued a joing order to their forces to advance southward to 
21cbina White Paper., p. 293. 
22Belden, ~· ill•, p. 445'. 
23"Ultimatum," ~, LIII {April 25, 1949), P• 30. 
24Belden, .2E• ~., P• 454. 
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,erate all China. 25 The Communist Army spearheaded its invasion of 
, south across the two miles wide Yangtze with wooden junks, 
:Cllntering almost no resistance from the Nationalist navy and air 
·c·e. The Communist Arnw marched into Nanking unopposed on 
·il 24, 1949, and in May opened a new drive toward Shanghai. 
mghai fell in June, 1949, which forced the Nationalist troops to 
lcuate to Formosa. 26 
In September, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the formal existence 
the People's Republic of China, removing the capital to Peiping •. 
. 
, Soviet Union recognized the revolutionary regime immediately as 
, legitimate government of Chi.na..27 By December, 1949, the 
um.mists had occupied the whole of China, compelling the Nationalist 
remment to flee to Formosa. 28 
25Ibid., PP• 455-456. 
26China White Paper, p. 3 23 • 
27Liu Tsun-chi, 111949--The Year of Victory," People's China, I 
nuary 1, 1950), P• 19. 
28"Last Phase,"~, LIV (December 12, 1949), p. 28. 
CHAPrER IX 
NATIONALIST DEFEAT AND COMMUNIST TRIUMPH 
In reviewing the Communist military victory and the defeat of 
.ang Kai-shek, it must be noted that in 1945 Generalissimo Chiang 
.-shek commanded an army of four million men, thirty-nine divisions 
which had been trained by American officials and equipped with 
.ted States arms, and that he had a powerful air force. Chiang was 
tuestioned dictator of these forces, as neither civilian officials 
• military leaders in the Nationalist government dared to question 
authority.1 
Why was Chiang unable to defeat the Communist guerrillas, who 
:ked mechanized equipment, air power, and a flow of supplies? The 
.lowing reasons might be listed: 
1. Chiang selected notoriously inept commanders to carry out 
orders, simply because he would not brook any criticism. 
2. The Nationalist forces were honeycombed with secret agents, 
1 could arrest officers in the field or at headquarters, despite 
1 objections of the field and staff commanders. 
3. Chiang authorized many divisional connnanders to report 
·ectly to him, in order to exercise greater control over the armed 
•ces. The corps comanders were stripped of actual authority, 
l.e the divisional comm.anders consulted iniividually with Chiang. 
l,Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York, 1949), p. l. 
consequent disruption in the unity of the field command was a 
or cause for the defeat of the Nationalists in Manchuria. 
4. The ranks of the Nationalist armies were composed of poor 
sant youths, who lacked influence and money to evade conscription, 
ch was administered through graft, bribery, and influence, so 
t the sons of the well-to-do escaped, while the sons of the poor 
e dragooned. The morale of the Nationalist forces was pitifully 
r, and the will to combat was lacking entirely. 2 On the other 
d, in the Communist Arrrry the officers were simply ranked as commanders 
commander-in-chief, with the commanders and the soldiers receiving 
al pay, equal food, and equal treatment. Every Communist unit 
m the platoon to the field command received political indoctrination 
m political. directors who raised the morale ard fighting spirit of 
troops.3 
The Nationalist government was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, 
seethed with the intrigue and conspiracy of ambitious cliques. Of 
se, there were three principal contenders for supremacy--the Soong 
ily group, including T. V. Soong, fonner premier of the Nationalist 
ernment, H. H. Kung, former minister of finance, and I1adame Chiang; 
clique headed by General Ho Ying-ching; and the so-called C. C. 
up, headed by the notorious Chen brothers. The Soongs dominated 
business and finance in China, while Ho Ying-ching exerted great 
luence among the military bureaucracy, and the Chen brothers 
2Ibid., PP• 3~-337 • 
3Ibid., p. 343. 
'.::IJ. 
ttrolled the Kuomintang machine. All three groups were present in 
cabinet, although the Chen clique held most of the cabinet posts. 4 
Chiang Kai-shek was the perennial commander-in-chief of the 
lY, and derived great power from his ability to balance the rival 
:tions through opportunistic compromises.5 However, there were a 
ber of weaknesses in Chiang's personality: (1) Chiang selected 
cabinet ministers those who were supine to him, as those who 
sessed intellectual ability and strong character were summoned, 
most, only during an emergency.6 (2) Like Hitler, Chiang disliked 
hear unpleasant news, and those close to him protected hi.in from 
harsh truth. (3) Chiang handled his officials as a lady handles 
household servants., and he attempted to direct and manage every-
ng., because he distrusted everyone. In short., Chiang had all the 
lts of a whimsical and headstrong dictator. 
After the prospect of a mediated peace ended., vast sums of paper 
ey were printed, until the price of rice had risen to astronomical 
ures. In August, 1948, Chiang issued new currency and attempted 
keep prices stable. Emergency laws were promulgated, and under 
eat of arrest and forcible house search, people were compelled to 
render to the Central Bank their gold and silver bullion and coins 
~ell as foreign currency.7 Speculation ensued, and valuables were 
rded. Within a few days the new currency was worthless, and angry 
Li-1:axwell s. Stewart, "Cross-Currents in China," The Nation, CLVII 
~tember 25, 1943), P• 345. 
5Ibid • ., P• 346. 
6Belden, £E• ~., P• 427. 
?Ibid., p. 407. 
sin Shanghai and Nanking looted rice shops, restaurants, and 
cery stores.8 
In the Communist areas silver coins were introduced and the 
munist radio broad.casted incessantly that private property would 
respected. Businessmen were led to believe that they might 
sper under Communist rule, so they sold gasoline, automobile 
ts, chemicals and other products to the Communists, boosting the 
itary effectiveness of their armed forces. 
After eight years of hostilities, the Chinese people were not 
ling to support a prolonged civil war which, it was commonly 
ieved, might have been settled amicably. Demonstrations against 
civil war were common, as thousands of students, workers, and 
' 
inessmen braved beatings, imprisorunent and bullets to protest 
.inst the Nationalist government 1s war policies. The secret police 
.ducted a reign of terror against intellectuals and students, which 
.enated the mass of Chinese intellectuals against Chiang, and paved 
way for the triumph of Communist propaganda in the urban centers. 
8Ibid., PP• 409-410. 
CHAPl'ER X 
CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
In September, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party summoned the 
·st plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Lference (C.P.P.C.C.) in Peking.1 Three organic or constitutional 
rs were adopted by the conference of delegates: (1) The Organic 
r of the Chinese People's Republic; (2) the Organic Law of the 
~ral People's Government; and (3) the Common Program of the 
• .P.c.c.2 According to these organic laws, the Chinese People's 
1ublic is a "popular democracy11 that is supported by the working 
,ss, the peasantry and the enlightened segments of the middle 
Lsses. The Chinese People's Republic regards itself as the vehicle 
free the Chinese masses from imperialism, feudalism and bureau-
,tic capitalism) 
The supreme organ of State power is vested in the All-China 
,ple's Congress, that is elected by adult suffrage. Between the 
.ef sessions of the All-China People's Congress, the Central People's 
·ernment Council (C.P.G.C.), like the Soviet Presidium, exercises 
olute legislative powers, formulating all laws, policies and 
lH. Arthur Steiner, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship in 
na," The Western Political Quarterly, III (~arch, 1950), p. 38. 
2Ibid. 
3chang Chih-jang, "Organic Law of the Central People's Government," 
na Digest, VII (November 2, 1949), P• 4. 
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•ectives to the administrative organs o Subordinate to the powerful 
1tral_People's Government Council are the State Administration 
mcil, the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the Supreme 
1ple 's Court and the Procurator-General.• s Office. 4 
The State Administration Council is Red China's highest executive 
:an, and, like a parliamentary ministry, comprises a premier, four 
:a-premiers and thirty-two councillors, who direct the activities 
al.l the departments. 
Separate and distinct from the State Administration Council, the 
•ple's Revolutionary Military Council exercises complete connnand 
1r the combined armed forces, including the People's Liberation 
r:y, as well as the militia -units. The Supreme People's Court and 
1 Procurator-General. 's Office are the highest judicial and prose-
,ing organs of the State.' While subordinated to these c.entral 
;ans are a series of locally elected councils, and of localized 
li.nistrators, tribunals and prosecutors.6 
The formal establishment of the Central People's Goverrunent of 
People's Republic of China resulted from a proclamation issued 
Mao Tse-tung on October 1, 1949, which served to notify the world 
imunity that the new govemment sought diploma.tic recognition 
its de facto existence as the sovereign authority of China. 7 
4nobert c. North, Moscow am Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1953), 
2~. 
$Ibid. 
6Ibid., p. 248. 
7Aitchen K. Wu, China and the SCJ'1iet Union, (London, 1950), P• .329. 
The Chinese People's Republic is ruled through the legal organs 
,ablished by the fundamental laws of 1949, but poli ticaJ. leadership 
: authority are the monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party, since 
1 responsible leaders of the party occupy all the positions of 
'er and command in the government. 8 Red China is a constitutional 
:tatorship of the Communist Party, whose purposes are proclaimed 
be the promotion of the security and welfare of the proletariat, 
.santry and those of the middle classes who support the regime. 
Pursuant to the Mao-Stalin meeting, held in Moscow during 
,ruary, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime concluded a military 
.iance with the Soviet Union.9 Although the declared intent of 
$ treaty was to ally China and the U.S. S. R. against 'any possible 
;ure aggression originating from Japan, Red China's purpose in 
Lcluding the alliance was to bolster her internal stability as well 
her external security.lo 
The premise of Chinese Communist foreign policy, as outlined by 
i Common Program is the endorsement and support of all national 
lependence movements in opposition to capitalistic imperialism.11 
Bs. B. Thomas, "Government and Administration in China Today, 11 
:ific Affairs, XXIII, No. 1 (March, 1950), pp. 258-259. 
9Tsou Yen, 11A History Meeting in Moscow," People's China, V 
muary 1, 1950), pp. 5-6. 
lOKo Pai-nien, "New China's Foreign Policy," China Digest, VII 
)Verri:>er 2, 1949), p. 8. (Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy states: 
1 the era when :imperialism still exists, it is impossible for the 
1uine people's revolution of any country to win its own victory 
;hout the assistance from the international revolutionary forces. 
is also impossible to consolidate the victory even when it is won. 11 ) 
llH. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign 
.icy," The American Journal of International. Law, XLIV (January, 1950) 
, 74- 7 • 
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l China regards the United States as the principal imperialist 
rer in the world and, as such, an inevitable enemy that must be 
>0sed, in alliance with the U.S. s. R. and the "popular democracies" 
Eastern Europe •12 Yet, 1 ike the U. S. S. R. , Communist China is 
:pared to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalistic 
l imperialistic countries, including the United States, on the basis 
the rules of international law and comity.13 
Since the formal establishment of the Communist regime in October, 
9, the Chinese Communists have steadily increased their power and 
stige internally as well as internationally. Internally, the 
nese Communists openly admit that their military victory in the 
il war against the Kuomintang was due to the overwhelming support 
the Chinese intelligentsia and the peasantry. Since 1949 the 
nese Communist Party has continued, through its policies., to 
1ent its bond of unity with these two classes. The academic scholars 
professionally-trained intellectuals occupy the positions of 
hori ty and prestige in the governmental structure of Red China. 
se having western training exercise leadership in the central and 
al administrations, and are entrusted with direction over the 
demic md scientific institutions •14 
Vis-a-vis the peasantry, the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship 
devoted itself to carrying out the progra.~ of land redistribution, 
h the active participation of the peasants themselves. Leaders 
12Ibid., p. 77 ff. 
l3Ibid., p. 91. 
14conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. :I<"'airbank, A 
wnentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, 1952), p.-476. 
1ng the local peasantry are appointed magistrates and labor heroes, 
l peasant associations are set up in every district. The local 
dnistrations assist the peasants to establish waterworks and to 
"I ( 
.se emergency loans so as to make possible more intensive utilization 
productive lands.15 
In the urban centers illicit and criminal activities are for the 
~t time being effectively suppressed by the authorities, all 
luaion between the underworld and the administrations having been 
•ooted. In the villages the pao-chia systau of authority has been 
,laced by representative assemblies, while the former bureaucratic 
rls have been replaced by people's courts.16 Many former bureau-
.tic employees, nevertheless, remain at their posts because of the 
.te need for trained personnel. Only those having a criminal 
:ord, or those who refuse their loyalty to the new regime_ have been 
loved, thus :far, from their jobs.17 
Tactically, the Chinese Communist Party has utilized every 
sible measure to stimulate the Chinese people towards greater 
,ionalism and patriotism, as a means of winning their loyal.ty and 
,ive support. In his opening address to the C.P.P.C.C. Mao Tse-tung 
.ted: "Our nation will never be an insulted nation any more. We 
·e already stood up. The Chinese people are now master of their own 
d."18 Mao Tse-tung emphasized further that: 
15Mary c. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism," Pacific 
!!!?., XlIV, No. 1 (March, 1951), PP• 264-265. 
16 
H. Arthur Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," The American 
itical Science Review, XLIV {March, 1950), pp. 50-51. 
17Ibid., p. 59. 
18 8 Ko, 2E• ~., P• • 
In defeating China in war, the imperialistic powers had 
taken many Chinese dependent states and a,,J>art of her 
terr.itories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, L'fhi/ Ryukyu Islands, 
/:fhe7 Pescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Burm.a, 
Bhutan, Nepal and Hongkong; France occupied Annam; and even 
an insignificant country like Portugal., al.so took Macao.19 
:;,u 
On January 1, 19.50, the Chinese Communist Party, in a New Year's 
· message, declared that Tibet was an integral. part of China, 
reupon in October, 19.50, Chinese Communist forces occupied that 
ntry. The effect of these declarations and positive actions has 
n to stir up intense pride and patriotism among the Chinese over 
Communists• success in re-assert.ing the sovereignty and prestige 
China. 20 
The Communist regime treats Inner M<llgolia and Sinkiang as 
1endent nations within the Chinese People's Republic, but being 
ional minorities, they are allowed to develop freely their own 
gua.ges, customs, and forms of worship. Inner Mongolia has become 
autonomous region under the jurisdiction of.' the Northeast Regional 
ernment, while Sinkiang forms an integral part of the Northwest 
inistrative Region, and its new provincial government, which was 
,ablished at the end of 1949, is a broad coalition government that 
ludes pro-Soviet Turkestans, Chinese Communists and ex-Kuomintang 
icials. 21 
Externally, after United Nations troops had advanced to the Yalu 
·er in Noveni:>er, 1950, the Chinese Communists intervened in force 
l9Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party 
China," China Digest, V (February 22, 1949), P• 21. 
20werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy (!li.nneapolis, 1953), 
.3.3.5-.3.36. 
21rhomas, .21?• ill•, pp. 264-265. (The Chinese garrisons in 
kiang have been instructed to respect Moslem mosques and their 
'Vices.) 
support the North Korean Communist regime. After a year and a 
f of active warfare in Korea, Cormuunist China was strengthened 
i tically and militarily, thanks to the propaganda appeal that the 
cessfully waged war engendered. The ability of the Chinese to 
nd.li tary victories against a coalition of Western powers, headed 
the United States, was a psycholcgical victory that the Communist 
ime was able to exploit with B.m!lzing success. 
Vis-a-vis the Indo-China War the Chinese Communists extended 
lomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam Democratic Republic_ 
ly in January, 1 9.50. 22 Since then great quantities of ammunition 
. equipment have rolled into Indo-China from China, accompanied by 
itary advisors and technicians to assist the Vietminh troops 
inst the French. Premier Chou En-lai, at the recent Geneva 
.ference, denounced the United States government for financing the 
inch war effort in Indo-China, and for its threat to intervene in 
·ce in that colonial war. 2.3 
The Chinese Communists have taken a stand on the Indo-China 
77 
.onial war because of: (1) their determination to exercise a major 
itica.l role in Asia, and to recover Formosa, the Pescadores and 
other islarxis that are held by the Nationalists, and (2) their 
:iety to gain admission into the United Nations, as the legitimate 
·ernrnent of China, with its pennanent seat on the Security Council. 
It is undeniable that Communist China is already a great Asiatic 
rer, whose manpower and natural resources exert great weight on the 
22Milton Sacks, "The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," 
:ific Affairs, XXIII, No. 1 (1"1a.rch, 1950), P• 242. 
23The New York Times, ~.ay 13, 1954, p. 1. 
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le of the world balance of power. Because of connnon ideology and 
idarity in the international rivalry against the capitalistic West, 
Chinese Communist regime has maintained a close relationship with 
U.S. s. R. However, there is no evidence that either China's 
munists or the Chinese people are willing to subordinate their 
ticular aspirations to the policies of the U. S. S. R. Reports of 
ction between Chinese and Russians, sent to give technical aid to 
na, have been published in Chinese Communist newspapers, and 
nese Communist leaders frankly admit that the Chinese masses are-
11 suspicious of the Soviet Union, and that pro-American sentiment 
still strong among the people.24 
Mao Tse-tung is not regarded by his countrymen and followers as 
uppet of the Soviet Union, but rather as a patriot, whose success 
due to his consistent championship of national independence and 
eless opposition against foreign domination.25 It is possible that 
Chinese people, under the Connnunist stimulus towards nationalism 
patriotism, may engender political pressures that may ultimately 
armine the internationalist ideological foundation of the Communist 
~y. 
Reports caning from Red China indicate that there are two factions 
rl.n the Communist Party strugglilll; for power, and that the rivalry 
24'rheodore Hsi-en Chen, "Observable Weaknesses of the Chinese 
~unist Regime," New Weapons For a New Diplomacy, XXVIII (December., 
~), p. 174, (Generally, the Chinese people are pro-American, 
mse they think the American missionaries have done wonderful jobs 
:hina by establishing hospitals, churches and schools, whicll have 
J.y given services to the Chinese people.) 
2'Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Connm.mism and the Rise of Nao, 
lbridge, 1951)., p. 187. 
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ultimately cool China's relations towards the Soviet Union. 
The_ future or the Peking-Moscow axis may depend ultimately upon 
degree of Soviet willingness to support the expansion or Chinese 
er and prestige., and to assist its industrialization program 
ough equitable exchanges and loans. Whether the u. S. s. R. and 
China have the same conception. or their respective roles in Asia 
in the world politics cannot at present be answered. Should the 
itions or the Chinese Reds not coincide with those or the u. s. s. R., 
ls not difficult to foresee the outbreak or an even more impressi-ve 
oist revolt against Communist unity. 
26 Reports would indicate that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai of 
naticnal facticn are struggling for power against the international 
~ion led by Liu Tsun-chi, Li Li-sen, am Lin Piao. 
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